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Vor.. XVII. JUNE, 1919 No. 8 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS IN WAR 
TIME: THE ESPIONAGE ACT. 
T HE Imperial German Government had never made a secret of its willingness to encourage disloyalty among the citizens and 
subjects of Germany's enemies. It had officially announced: 
"Bribery of enemies' subjects, acceptance of offers of treachery, 
utilization of discontented elements in the population, support of 
pretenders and the like are permissible; indeed, international law 
is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the crimes of third 
parties."1 · 
Before our own entrance into the war, othei; governments had 
discovered that German propaganda was a real menace and had 
taken action accordingly. The Governor-General of Canada, for 
example, under authority of the War-Measures Act of 1914, had 
issued dractic regulations.2 • 
• The following discussion is preliminary to a more extended treatment of the sub-
ject which the author is preparing under the direction of Prof. E. S. Corwin, of Prince-
ton University. 
1 German War Book-Morgan Tral_lSlation-Page as. 
2 I~ shall be an offense (a) To print, publish, or pnbffcly exprcsS any adversf or un· 
favourable statement, report, or opinion concerning the causes of the present war or"the 
motives or purposes for which Canada or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland or any of the Allied nations entered upon or prosecute the same, which may tend 
to arouse hostile feeling, create unrest, or unsettle or influence public opinion. 
(b) To print, publish, or publicly express any adverse or unfavourable statement, 
report, or opinion concerning the action of Canada or the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland or any of the allied nations in prosecuting the war. 
(c) To print etc., any report etc., respecting the work or activities .of any depart· 
ment, branch or officer of the public service or the service or activities of Canada's mill· 
tary or naval forces, which may tend to inflame public opinion and thereby hamper the 
Government of Canada or prejudicially affect its military or naval forces in the prosecu· 
tion of the war. · · 
(d) To print etc., any report of any secret session of the House of Commons or 
to refer to any secret session of the House of Commons or Senate held in pursuance 
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The problem that confronted the United States, when it became 
evident that we could not avoid wa:r, was to meet the German at-
tempts to arouse disloyalty among the citizens of the United States, 
and at· the same time to keep within the limits of the authority 
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. . 
The first legislation was clearly within the power of Congress. 
Early in February, 1917, both houses passed, almost without debate, 
the following ·bill : 
. ' 
"Any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes 
to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery 
from any post office or 'by any letter carrier any letter, paper, 
· writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to 
take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of 
the United Stat~s, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise 
makes any such threat, shall upon conviction be fined not ex-
ceding $1,000.00 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or 
both."8 
I. 
THIS CENSORSHIP PROVISION • 
. But the broader problem of thwarting German propaganda still 
retnained, and, in February, 1917, the Attorney General recom-
mended that legislation supplementary to the National Defense Act 
of March 3, 19u, be enacted. Accordingly, Mr. Overman intro-
duc~d a measure into the Senate designed to give the President 
power to issue certain rules governing the publication of informa-
tion which might be useful to an enemy of tqe United States.' Two 
of a resolution passed by the said House or Senate, except such report thereof as may 
be officially communicated through the director of public information. 
(e) Without lawful authority to r-ublish the contents of any confidential document 
belonging to, or any confidential information obtained from, any Governmental depart• 
ment or any person in the service of His Majesty. 
(0 Any person found guilty of an offense hereunder shall upon (summary) con· 
viction, be 'liable to a fine not exceeding $s,ooo, or to imprisonment for not more than 
five years, or ooth fine and imprisonment. 
Gcingressional Record 65 Cong., :znd sess., p. 6516 (May 4, 1918) • 
.. C. R., 64th Congress (House Record 15314), p. :z972, Feb. 6, 1917. 
• "Whoever, in time of war, in violation of regulations to be prescribed by the Pres· 
ident, which he is hereby authorized 'o make and promulgate, shall collect, record, pub-
lish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any' information with respect to the movements, 
number,S, description, condition or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aero-
planes, or war mat!!rials of the U. S., or with re5pect to the plans or ~onduct, or suP. 
posed plans or conduct, of any military or naval operation, or with respect to any works 
or measures undertaken for or connected with or intended for the fqrtification or de· 
fense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, or calcu· 
lated to be or which might be useful to the· enemy, shalt be punished by a fine of not 
more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or both by such fine 
and imprisonment. C. R. 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 31-.t:z. Feb. 8, 1917 (S. 8148). 
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days later the same bill was introduced into the House by Mr. Webb. 
The bill passed the Senate within a week after it had been reported, 
by a vote of 6o to IO, with 20 not voting. The rush of business, 
however, prevented its consideration in the House at this session, 
and it did not reach a vote. · 
On April 2, 1917, Mr. Culberson of Texas introduced the so-
called Espionage Bill into the Senate. It was stated that originally 
the Senate committee had tried to frame such a bill in accordance 
with the wishes of the Department of Justice, but that, failing to 
construct a satisfactory measure, they had called upon Assisfant 
Attorney General Warren,.who had prepared seventeen bills .cover-
ing the subjects on which legislation was desired. After cutting 
these bills down to fourteen, the Committee combined them into 
the Espionage Bill. Of the many proyisions of the bill, I shall 
deal first with subsection ( c), Section 2, Title I, which reads as 
follows: 
"Whoever, in time of war-, in violation of regulations to 
be prescribed by the President, which he is hereby author-
ized to make and promulgate, shall collect, record, publish, 
or communicate or attempt to elicit any information . with 
respect to the movements, numbers, description, condition, 
or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aeroplanes, 
or war materials of the United States, or with respect to 
the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct, of any 
naval or military operations, or with respect to any works 
or measures undertaken for or connected with the fortifi-. 
cation or defense of any place, or any other information i:e-
lating to the public defense or calculated- to be or which 
might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than $10,000.00 or by imprisonment for not 
more thap. ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment; 
provided;" that nothing in this section shall be construed to· 
limit or restrain any discussion, comment or criticism of the 
acts or policies of the Government, or its representatives, or 
the publications of the same; provided, no discussion, com-
ment or criticism shall convey information prohibited under 
this section.?'11 
Though in content this section was virtually the same as the 
measure which had received the approval of the Senate at the close 
of the previous session, and though it was stamped from the out-
'65th Cong., 1st Session 1917, p. 766. 
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set with the imprimatur of the Administration; 6 its appearance 
was a signal for a violent outburst on the· part of certain news-
papers, which at once jumped to the conclusion that a censorship 
of the press was .to be attempted. Said the MILWAUK:£:£ N£ws, 
which had recently adopted the slogan of "Follow:. the President": 
"The Censorship bill • • has aroused such a storm of q.is-
approval that 1;he Presidenf seeks to allay popular indignation at 
this glaring attempt to void Constitutional rights. The 
whole program to muzzle the press seems to smack of unconstitu-
tionality, tyranny, and deceit."7 The N£w YoRK TIM:£S, too, was 
greatly alarmed, and devoted a considerable part of its editorial 
space·throughout several days to criticism of.the measure and espe-
cially of its alleged unco~stitutionality.8 On the other hand, the 
Ou':L'LOOK, ordinarily no friendly critic of the Administration, came 
to the defense of the measure, ·saying: "The country has a right 
to protect itself • · • · . by prohibiting the publication of any in-
formation which will .do injury to the country and give aid and 
comfort to its enemies."9 
The same division of opinion appeared in ~ongress. Here the 
opponents of the '~Censorship Section," of wJ:iom Senator Borah 
was· the priricipal spokesmari, raised three constitutional objections: 
(I) That it proposed an unconstitutional delegation of power of 
legislation to the President; (2) that it denied trial by jury as x:,e-
• l{y DEAK MR. Wna:7 
I have been very much surprised to find several of ·the public prints stating that 
the administration .113d abandoned the position which it so distinctly took, and still holds, 
tbat authority to exercise censorship over tbe press, to the extent that tbat censorship 
is .embodied in tbe recent action of the House of Representatives is absolutely necessary 
for tbe protection of tbe Nation. :i; have every confidence tbat the great majority of tbe 
newspapers of tbc country will observe a patriotic retic~nce abont everything whose pub-
lication could be of injury, but in every _country tbere are some persons in a position 
to do mischief in tbis field who can not be relied upon, and whose interests or dcSircs 
will lead to action on tbcir part highly dangerous to tbe nation in the midst of a war. 
I want to say again that it seems to me imperatil'C that powers of this sort should be 
granted. · · 
Cordially and sincerely yours, • 
/ WooDROw WILSON. 
C. R., 65th Cong., Jst Sess., p. 3343, May 3J, J9J7. See also Brisbane letter, C. R., 
.6stb Cong., Jst Sess, p. J7o8. 
T Milwaukee NeTIJ.r, April 30, J9J7. . 
• NeTIJ York Times, April JO, JgJ7. Sec also, April J3, J6, Jg, 20, 22, 23, 24; May 
3, 4' ;;. 
• O!'fl.,ok, May 9, JgJ7. C. R., 65tb Cong., ±st Scss., p. 223J, May n, Jg17." 
19 Revised ~tatutcs, Sec. 5388, C-3, p. J044- Said tbe Court: "But the authority 
to -make administrative rules is not a d~egation of legislative power, nor are such rules 
raised from an administrative to a legislative character because tbe violation tbereof is 
punished as a public offense." U. S. v. Grima11c1, 220 U. S. 52J (J9u). See also 
Fielcl v. Clarke, J43 U. S. 649. 
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quired by the Constitution; (3) that it effected an unconstitutional 
abridgement of the freedom of the press. Let us consider these 
points in turn. 
(I) Would the power to issue rules within the scope of this 
bill have been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power? 
The courts have repeatedly held that Congress has a right to dele-
gate the power of determining ·some fact or state of thing~ upon 
which the operation of a law may be made to depend, and on this 
ground a very broad delegation of power to the Secretary of Agri-
culture to make rules governing the use by renters of the public 
grazing lands was recently upheld.10 With such adjudications as 
a basis, and in further consideration of the fact that the Commander-
in-Chief of the military forces has a right to issue rules· to safe-
·guard his forces, we may agree with the Administration leaders 
in holding that the section did 'not attempt an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power. 
(2) Did the sub-section provide a fair and impartial jury trial? 
The opponents of "censorship" made the point that the only question 
left to the jury would be the fact of publication, and not whether 
such news would be of any value to the enemy. They also charged 
that a change of venue could be had whenever the Government 
desired it. But had these been their real objections to the measure 
the amendments offered by Mr. Gard in the House11 and by Mr. 
Ashurst in the Senate12 must have removed their opposition. As 
it was, Mr. Ashurst's amendment was voted down in the Senate 
largely by the opponents of the sub-section themselves. 
(3) We are brought, therefore, to the question whether the 
"censorship" provision would have violated constitutional freedom 
of the press. Amendment I of the Constitution reads as follows: 
"Co':lgress shall make no law • • • abridging the freedom of 
the press." At·. the time of the Amendment's adoption there was 
little controversy as to the meaning of these words. Blackstone 
had announced the doctrine that the liberty of the press "consists 
11 The pertinent part of the Gard Amendment reads as follows: " * * * In any pros· 
ecution hereunder the jury trying the case shall determine not only whether the defend· 
ant or defendants did willfully and without proper authority publish the information (rclat· 
ing to the national defense) * * * but also whether such information was of such a char· 
.acter as to be useful to the enemy * • *" Full text see C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess.; p. 
1858, May 4, 1917. 
22 Ashurst Amendment: "Whoever, in time of war, shall furnish any information 
with respect to the mov.ements, etc. * * * of the armed forces, etc. • * * shall be pun· 
ished; provided that in any prosecution the jury shall determine whether such informa-
tion was caleulated to be useful to the enemies of the U. S." C. R., 6sth Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 2139, Ma:r 9, 1917. 
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in laying no previous restraint on publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matters when published." "Every free-
man," he had declared, "has an undoubted right to lay what senti-
ments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the 
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mis-
chievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temer-
ity. To punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or 
· offensive writings, which, when published, shall upon fair and im-
·partial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for 
the preserv~tion of the peace and good order, of government arid 
religion, the only foundations of civil liberty."13 
The Congressional debaters agreed generally that this was the 
'test of the freedom of the press at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution. The point on which they disagreed was whether sub-
section ( c) really gave the President the power of establishing a 
censorship of the press. But Senator B~rah contended further that 
such rules as the Pre!?ident would be authorized to make under 
this bill would constitute a violation of the freedom of the press, 
even if, as was prob<ible, no actual board of censors was established, 
a proposition, however, for whiCh he was able to adduce no real 
authority. u 
The defenders of the sub-section, admitting that Amendment I 
was meant to operate in time of war as well as in time of peace, 
denied that it ·was the intention of the Administration to establish 
a board of censors.15 Indeed, said Senator Overman, the rules to 
·:is Cooley's Blackstone, Bk lV, pp. x51-152. See also Rex v. Cuthill, 27 St. Trials 
675; Patterson v. Colora<lo, 205 U. S. 454; Dicey, Laws of the Constitution, 8th ed., p. 
a42; Cawan v. Fairbrother, 24 S. E. Rep. 212. 
Mr. Gilbert E. Roe, Amicus Curiae in the case of Peterson v • . u. S. (Oct., x918), 
contends at length that Blackstone's definition of "freedom of the press" was not the 
generally accepted one at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Mr. Roe reaches 
this conclusion from a consideration of (1) The address by the Continental Congress to 
the inhabitants of Quebec. (2) The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. (3) The Virginia 
Report x799-1800. (4) The pardoning of all convicted under the Sedition Act of x798. 
(5) The discussjon of Blackstone by Tucker, quoted below in part. 
The author's view is that Blackstone's definition was probably not accepted unani· 
mou~ly by the framers of the Constitution; but was adopted later by the Courts. 
Justice Holmes, in Sclienk v. U. S., says on this point: "It well may be that the 
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, 
although to prevent them may have been its main purpose * * *" Bulletin 194. 
>< In support of this position Mr. Siegel quoted, as if it had been a judicial decision, 
the following words of the attorney for the defense (Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan): The 
history which precedes the First Amendment shows clearly that it was made to prevent 
a censorship of the press, either by anticipation through a licensing system or retrospec· 
tion by obstruction or punishment." 229 U. S., 292 (1913). 
He might have found better authority in Tucker (2 Tucker-Blackstone Commentaries, 
App. 20), where the author says: "The security of the freedom of the press requires 
that it shall be exempt, not only from pre7!ious restraint by the executive * * * but from 
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·be laid down by the President, instead of being a previous restraint, 
would in reality be beneficial to the press ; . for they would give 
information as to what could be published with impunity. They 
would thus allow the press a greater latitude than a voluntary 
agreement plan possibly could; since the papers could publish, with-
out fear of punishment, anything that was not prohibited by the 
;rules, and also anything prohibited by them provided the publisher 
was willing to take the consequences. 
The real question, therefore, was whether any real restraint 
could be laid upon publication in war time. National safety, said 
the supporters of the measure, makes congressional action valid, 
provided the action taken be taken in good faith tQ prevent a sub-
version of govemment.16 Thus, even Madison had owned that it 
was "vain to oppose constitutional ·barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation."17 "The question," said Senator Fall, "as to whether 
or not this is necessary legislfition is a question of policy. We may 
well differ on that. To deny, however, the power of this 
government to do anything necessary for its preservation is to deny 
the work of our forefathers, and it is to deny the work of the men 
who saved the Union under Abraham Lincoln."18 
Thus the way was paved for the more positive argument that 
the war power of Congress extends to a control over the press, if 
such control is necessary to carry the war to a successful conclu-
sion, and that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the military 
forces, is the best judge of such necessity. · 
In support of this position, the advocates of the sub-section were 
able to quote various judicial dicta, for instance, that "Congress 
legislative restraint also; and that this exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption 
not only from previous inspection of licenses, but from subsequent penalty of law.'' 
11 Representative Kahn, however, introduced an amendment providing for a board 
of censors to be composed of one member from each of the following: Department of 
State, Navy, An:r<y, ;ind four newspaper editors. C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., May 4, 
1917. Mr. Kahn's purpose seems to have been to make the bill so drastic as to bring 
about its defeat. See his speech of May 3. C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1794-
Senator Thomas objected that it was only in time of war that these great constitu· 
tional limitations upon despotism are put to test. C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 774 
See also Ex Parle Milligan, 4 Wall. · 
"Story says: "The language of this Amendment imports no more than that a man 
shall have a right to speak. write or print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, 
without auy prior restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his 
rights, person, property or reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby disturb 
the public peace or attempt to subvert the Government." Story "Commentaries," 1851 
ed., pp. 597-598. 
Sec also Roberls:m v. Balt!win, 165 U. S. 275; State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18. 
1tMadison Papers, No. 41. 
u C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 844. 
""Ex Parle Milligan, 4 Wall. See also Whiting, ''War Powers," p. 163. 
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has the power to provide by law for carrying on war and that this 
power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prose-
cution of the war with vigor and success, (;!Xcept such as interfere 
with the command of forces and conduct of campaigns."19 Pur-
suing this thought, Mr. Overman urged that "the good of society 
is superior to the right of the press to publish what it pleases ; 
wherefore, if the activities of newspapers were a hindrance in the 
prosecution of the 111ar, their curtailment would not be unconsti-
tutional."20 
The weight of the argument clearly lay with the Administration 
-leaders. It is true that the language of the sub-section was broad 
enough to allow the establishment of a board of censors, and that 
an involiintary censorship would, by the ·burden of authority, be 
unconstitutional. But was it probable that the President, who has 
the advice of the Attorney ·General,· would endanger his authority 
by pressing it to such lengths? It is more likely, to say the least, 
that his proclamation would only have defined the character of 
utterances which would, in his opinion, be useful to the enemy. 
Certainly no one can contend that the press has a right to publish 
·information useful to the enemy; and if the Presidential rules de-
clarative ·of this matter had been essentially reasonable the courts 
would undoubtedly have upheld them. In any case, had the Senate 
accepted the Ashurst amendment, which provided. that the jury 
should determine whether the facts published were actually of use 
to the enemy, there can scarcely be a douht that the constitutionality 
of the section would have been sustained. 
But argument hardly determined the fate of the measure. News-
papers are politically powerful today,21 and men whose political for-
tunes are dependent upon their support naturally consider their 
attitude toward measures before voting. At least, it is difficult to 
account on any other theory for the fact that other sections of the 
bill which restricted free speech were passed, while sub-section C 
was so vioJently denounced. Also, an examination of the history 
"" See in this connection State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18. The principle is laid down 
that no one may use his property to the injury of society. 
"'The papers finally agreed to a voluntary censorship. Under this agreement, news 
is clivid~d into three classes: (1) That which is palpably valuable to the enemy. This 
includes the mo;vements of troops and similar topics. (:i) That which is patently not 
valuable to the enemy. Articles descriptive of battles, of progress in naval and aviation 
construction fall in this class. (3) Doubtful topics. The editors submit doubtful matter 
to the Committee of Public. Information before publication. Articles criticizing the ad· 
ministration are exempt from objection on that score. Attacks upon Mr. Creel, the 
civilian chairman, have minimized the board's influence. The censorship board was es-
tablished by proclamation of President Wilson on A]lril 14. 1917. 
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of the bill will show that every effort was made to eliminate the 
features most objected to, with the result that, in the end, the oppo-
sition were forced to admit their hostility to the sub-section in 
any form whatsoever. The entire discussion may well be termed 
a "Tempest in a Tea-pot," a "Much Ado About Noth~ng." 
ir. 
Excr,usION ~OM 'tHE MAII,S. 
The control over the press of the country, which was denied the 
Administration when sub-section C was voted down, was presently 
obtained under Title XII of the Espionage Act, which in its final 
form reads as follows: 
"Every letter, writing, circular, postal 'card, picture, print, 
engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, ·book, or other 
publication, matter or thing of any kind in violation of any 
of the provisions of this Act is hereby declared to be non-
mailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or 
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier. 
"Sec. 2. Every letter, writing, circular, postal card, pic-
ture, print, engraving, photograph, newspaper, . pamphlet, 
book, or other publication, matter or thing of any kind con-
taining any JDatter advocating or urging treason, insurrec-
tion, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States 
is hereby declared to be non-mailable. 
"Sec. 4. Whoever shall use or attempt to use the mails 
or the postal ser\Tice of the Government for the transmission 
of any matter declared ·by this chapter to be-.non-mailable 
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned fo:i; not 
more than five years, or both. Any person violating any 
provision of this chapter may ·be tried and punished either 
in the district in which the unlawful matter or publication 
was mailed, or to which it was carried by mail for deliv:ery 
according to the direction thereon, or in which it was caused 
to be delivered by mail to the person to whom it was ad-
dressed."22 
22 Secs. 3 and s were stricken out. They read as follows: 
"Sec. 3. The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any 
person, firm, association or company is using the mails for the circulation or dissemina-
tion of any matter by this act declared to be non-mailable, forbid the use of the mails 
by any such person, concern, association or company. 
"Sec. 5. An order of the Postmaster General forbidding the use of the mails in any 
case under the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to review by injunction pro-
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The most notable case that has arisen under Ti~le XII is that of 
the MASSES PUBLISHING COMPANY, which is worth more than pass-
ing notice in this connection. 
The contest ~etween the MAssEs and the authorities began. with 
the action of Postmaster Patten of New York in excluding the 
August (1917) issue of this periodical from the mails. 
Immediately Mr. Rogers, representing the MASSES, called upon 
Solicitor General Lam~r of the Postoffice Department to explain 
this action. According to Mr. Rogers' report, which, however, is 
contradicted by the Postmaster General, no definite objection to 
this particular issue of the MASSES was offered by the Department; 
but Mr. Rogers was informed that the whole tone of the publica-
tion was in violation of the Espionage Act and that its editors would 
be liable to prosecution unless they ceased publishing seditious mat-
ter, such as the cartoqns which the excluded issue contained. An 
inquiry instituted by Representative Meyer London and a protest 
signed by Dm;lley Field Malone, George Creel and others is said to 
have received no more satisfactory reply than that given to Mr. 
Rogers.23 
Recourse was now had to the. courts, and on July 13 Judge 
Learned Hand was besought to grant a rule ordering Postmaster 
Patten to show cause why he should not be enjoined to release the 
MASSES. 
Three days later Judge Hand adjourned the hearing pending 
investigation and possible settlement of the case out of court, and 
on July 17th Morris Hilquit renewed the attempt to get a definite 
specification of the kind of matter liable to exclusion from the 
mails, contending that the activities of postmasters should be lim-
ited to the filing of a claim with the Department of Justice that 
periodicals were violating the Espionage Act. Any other course, 
he said, was unauthorized by law and constituted an abuse of power 
ceedings instituted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.'' C. R., 65th 
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1915, May 5, 1917. The revised law is found Stat., 65th Cong., 1st 
Sess., .230-231. 
23 Mr. Burleson in a letter to Congress said: "The postmasters at the place of 
publication of newspapers and periodicals and postmasters who submit other non-mailable 
matter are advised (whe·n matter is found to come within the prohibited clauses under 
the law) that it was non-mailable under the act of June 15, 1917. Postmasters are being 
instructed to notify each publisher promptly when his publication is •being held at the 
post office pending a ruling from the department as to its mailabi!ity. These cases. are 
disposed oi as rapidly as possible here. Postmasters submitting such publications are ad-
vised by telegraph of the action of the department and the publishers are promptly noti-
fied by them of the result." C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6852, Aug. ""• 1917. The 
notifications to the publishers were usually expressed in the language of the Espionage 
Act and did not give very definite reasons for the exclusion from the mails. See Official 
Bulletin, Oct. .27, 1917. 
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aimed at the freedom of the press. This protest, however, received 
no more attention than had previous ones, Mr. Burleson and Mr. 
Herron, his assistant, taking the same ground as before. 
The matter was thus thrown into court again, and on July 21 
the Postmaster General submitted the definite objections to the 
MASSES, alleging that several articles and cartoons were in viola-
tion of the Espionage Act. Judge Hand, though admitting that 
llie cartoons were "designed to arouse animosity to the draft and 
the war," granted an injunction, saying that the articles "did not 
counsel resistance to law and therefore did not violate the Espion-
age Act."2' He also urged the point that there was no distinction 
between non-mailable and indictable matter under the Act. 
Counsel for the Department, however, promptly secured from 
Judge Hough a temporary stay of injunction on the ground of 
error, though, pending the convening of the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals with power to dispose of the injunction issue, Mr. Patten · 
was required to give bond fo cover a possible damage suit if the 
case should be decided against him. . 
Before the Court of Appeals met, Mr. Burleson, in a letter to 
the Senate, charged the MASSES with being "a leader in propaganda 
to discourage enlistments, prevent subscriptions to Liberty Loans, 
and obstruct the draft."25 
The editors of the MASSES, however, were not to be warned 
from their course. The September issue was written in the same 
strain as the earlier one, and it too was excluded from the mails; 
and this time the exclusion was upheld by Judge A. N. Hand, who 
sustained the Postmaster General on the ground that the MASSES 
was not a "magazine or other publication regularly issued" within 
the meaning of the postal laws, inasmuch as certain issues had 
been justly excluded from the mails for a violation of the Espion-
age Act. 26 Th~s decision, therefore, asserted the justice of both 
exclusions. ' 
.. Quoted in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, Bulletin 7, p. 15. See also N. Y. Times, 
July 22, 1917. 
os C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6852, Aug. 22, 1917 • 
.. In a letter to the Senate, Aug. 22, 1917, Mr. Burleson said: "In order for any 
publication to ha\·e the second-class privilege, it must, among other things, be issued 
regularly at stated intervals, and in order to be penJlitted to the mails under any. classifi· 
cation it must be mailable under the law. 
All the publications, including the Masses, which have had the second-hand privi-
lege withdrawn on account of violations of the Espionage Act, have lost that classifica· 
tion primarily for the reason that they were publishing matter which made their issues 
non-mailable under any classification, and hence are not "newspapers and other periodl· 
cal publications" within the meaning of the law governing second-class matter. 
"For many years this department has held publications not to be 'regularly issued' 
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At this point it may be well to note some of the objectionable ut-
terances of the ¥Assts. The June issue contained the following 
passage: · 
"We wish to persuade _those who love liberty and democ-
racy enough to give their lives for it to withhold the gift 
from this war and save it to use in the sad renewal of the 
real struggle for liberty that will come after it,"-a very 
direct .appeal against enlistment. 
Again, the July issue said: 
"We brand the declaration of war by our ·Government as 
a crime against the people of the United States and against 
-the nations of the world." -
Similarly, the August issue was fiUed with glorification of those 
who refused to enlist and violated the law, and the September 
issue contained like matter in diluted form.:27 
On November 2, I9I7, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained 
Judge Hough's stay of injunction. Thereupon the news-stands be-
in contemplation of law when any issue contained non-iµailable matter; and when the 
second-class privilege has been withdrawn under such circumstances, the formal notice 
of withdrawal has contained the statement that the second-class privilege has been re-
voked on the grouµds stated • • * 
. "In the case of the Masses the final action was necessarily based on other and 
much broader grounds than a break in the continuity of publication." C. R., 65th 
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6852, Aug. 22, 1917. 
,.,. Bulletin 26, pp. 3·4- The case of the I eflers1Jnian. was similar to that of the 
Mass,s. In the issu~ of Jj!ne. 1917, we find: "Men conscripted to go to Europe are virtual· 
ly condemned to death and everybody knows it." A more direct appeal to obstruct re-
cruiting appeared in July': "I advise the conscripts to await the decision of the United 
Stales Supreme Court and not to be clubbed by the fact of conscription into enlistment." 
Judge Speer, taking the same ground that Judge Hough had taken in the Masses case, 
declared that the Postmaster General was right in excluding the Jeffersonian from the 
mails. Bulletin 24. 
But the Espion~.ge Act applies not only to comments on American affairs but to 
those in regard to our allies. For example the Gaelic American was excluded from the 
mails fol" printing the following in regard to the British Attorney General, Sir Frederick 
Smith:· "Smith is in this country as the agent of the English Government, for the 
purpose of perfecting cooperation betwee,; the United States and England in the war. 
Yet he has no hesitation in making a bitter and brutal attack on the Irish People * * * 
The clear-headed, keen-witted Yankees who read his bitter attack on the Irish will not 
wonder at the Irish for refusing to fight for a government of which Smith is a member." 
The Irish World was equally bitter against our allies and was excluded from the 
mails for saying: "In fpite of political changes in any direction, the trend of French 
"life and ideals for a century has been toward materialism. After every war and every 
·misfortune their Government, political science, civic ideals, and other artistic productions 
lia~e gone lower in the scale from the Catholic ideal." 
Again of Palestine, it said: "Nothing of the sort [the establishment of a Jewish 
Kingdom] is either promised or probable. Unless the Peace Congress should oblige them 
to give up Paleshne, the country will be put on the same footing as Egypt. It will con· 
t!nue under alien rule." · 
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gan refusing to receive copies of the MASSES, fearing prosecution 
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which had just been enacted. 
Presently the MASSES staff were indicted on the two-fold charge of 
attempting to send non-mailable matter through the mails, and of 
conspiracy to violate· the Espionage Act, but the two trials which 
followed both resulted in hung juries. 
The MASSES had meantime ceased to exist, but the same editorial 
'staff now publishes the °LIBERA'l'OR, which has thus far avoided trou-
ble with the postal authorities. 
The MASSES Case squarely raised three Constitutional issues: 
( l) Is circulation in the mails a part of the freedom of the press? 
(2).Have the courts the power to review the Postmaster General's 
decisions as to non-mailability, or is the decision of· the ~ostmaster 
General final? (3) Does the exclusion from the mails deprive a 
publisher of property without due process of law? Let us consider 
these points in turn. 
( l) The contention that the denial of postal facilities is tanta-
mount to a denial of the right of publication was first voiced by 
Calhoun many years ago. But tlie Court has subsequently been at 
pains to point out that the argument was not well founded. 
In Ex parle Jackson, 96 U. S. 733, the Suprem~ Court, in deny-
ing that a law excluding lottery tickets from the mails abridged 
the freedom of the press, said: "In excluding v~rious articles from 
the mails the object of Congress has not ibeen to interfere with the 
freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the people, but to 
refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious 
to the public morals." Also, in 'Upholding the act of 189<> by which 
"any newspaper, circular, pamphlet or publication of any kitid con-
taining any advertisement of any lottery" was excluded from the 
mails, the Court remarked: "The circulation of newspapers is not 
prohibited, but ~he Government declines itself to become an agent 
in the circulation of printed matter which ·it regards as injurious 
to the people. The freedom of communication is not abridged 
wlthin the illtent and meaning of the provision unless Congress is 
absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not 
be carried in the mails, and compelled arbitrarily to assist in the 
dissemination of matter condemned by its judgµient through the 
governmental agencies which it controls.'128 
Finally in Public Clearing Hott.rev. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904) 
the Court said: "In establishing such [postal] system Congress may 
restrict its use to letters and deny it to periodicals; it may admit 
,. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. uo (1892). For the law, see 26 Stat. L., 463. 
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books to the mails and refuse to admit merchandise, or it may 
include all these and fail to embrace within its regulations telegrams 
or large parcels of merchandise." 
In short, the use of the mails, is, to an extent at least, a revocable 
privilege, and may be subjected to reasonable conditions.29 We may 
therefore agree with Judge Rogers in saying: "The Espionage Act 
imposes no restraint prior to publications, and no restraint after-
wards except as it restricts circulation through the mails. Liberty of 
circulating may be essential to the freedom of the press, but liberty 
of cir~ulating through the mails is not, so long as its transportation 
in any other way as merchandise is not forbidden.. . . The Espion-
age Act, in so far as it excludes [from the mails] certain matter 
declared to be non-mailable, is constitutional." (246 Fed. 29.) 
(2) Likewise, there can be no doubt that the decisions of the 
Postmaster General regarding the mailability of matter controlled 
by the Act are final. Some of the precedents governing this phase 
of the question are the following: 
In United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 140 [r888], 
the Court held that a mandamus. to the Commissioner of Pensions 
was properly refused, saying: "The Court will not interfere by man-
damus with the executive officers of the Government in the exercise 
of their ordinary official duties, even when those duties require an 
interpretatiqn of the law, the court having no appellate power for 
that purpose." Again in Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S· 
316, it was held that neither an injunction nqr a mandamus would 
lie against an officer of the Land Department to control him in 
!llscharging an official duty which required the exercise of his 
judgment and discretion. Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the 
Court, said: "Whether he [the Secretary of the Interior] decided 
right or wrong is not the question. Having jurisdiction to decide 
at all, he had necessarily jurisdiction and it was his duty to decide 
as he th9ught the law was, and the courts have no power whatever 
under those circumstances to review his determination by man-
damus or injunction." 
Still more to the point, if possibie, is the language of Justice 
Brown in Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. ro6 (1904). 
"Where Congress has committed to the head of a department cer-
tain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his 
20 In 1907; for example, Attorney General Bonaparte advised Mr. Roosevelt "that 
it is clearly and fully within the power of Congress to exclude from the mails publications 
such as La Questione Sociale and to make the use or attempted use of the mails for the 
transmission of such writing a crime against the United States. Rogers, Postal Powers 
of Congress, p. l 19. 
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action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will not 
be reviewed by the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or 
this court should be of the opinion that his action was clearly 
wrong."30 
From these cases Judge Rogers concluded: "This court holds, 
therefore, that if the Postmaster General has been authorized and 
directed by Congress not to transmit certain matter by mail and is 
to determine whether a particular publication is non-mailable under 
the law, he is required to use judgment and discretion in so determin-
ing, and his decision must be regarded as conclusive by the courts, 
unless it appears that it was clearly wrong.31 
The entire question, then, resolved itself into a determination 
whether the Postmaster General acted within his jurisdiction under 
the authority conferred upon him by Congress. His constitutional 
right to use discretion within that jurisdiction is clearly established. 
(3) Lastly, did the denial of postal facilities deprive the owners 
of the MAss:Es of property without due process of law? The argu-
ment that it did seems to rest on the assumption that due process 
of law always signifies judicial process, which is far from the case. 
In the words of Judge Cooley (Weimer v. Brubury, 30 Mich. 201), 
"there is nothing in these words ['due process of law'] which 
necessarily implies that due process of law must be judicial pro-
cess."32 Indeed the statute which confers powers upon the Post-
master General to prevent the mails from being used as an instru-
ment of fraud seems to stand on all fours with the present law, and 
it received the sanction of the Court in the following words: "It 
is too late to argue that due process of law is denied whenever the 
disposition of property is affect~d by the order of an executive de-
partment. Many, if not most, of the matters presented to these 
departments require for their proper solution the judgment or dis-
cretion of the head of the department, and in many cases, notably 
those connected"·with the disposition of the .public lands, the action 
""Sec also Dec.Uur v. Paulding, 14 Peters 497: Public Clearing Houu v. Coyne, 
194 U. S.: Smith v. Hitchee>ck, 226 U. S.; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 
HMasses Publisliing Company v. Patten, Bulletin 7, p. 10 and 246 Fed. 33. As 
Judge Hongh said: "It is at least arguable whether any constitutional government can 
be judicially compelled to assist in the dissemination of something that proclaims itself 
rcvolutionary,-which exists not to reform but to destroy the rule of any party, clique 
or faction that could give even lip service to the Constitution of the United States." 
New York Times, Aug. 2, 1917. 
In the Masses case and the Jeffersonian case his action was upheld. To show the 
Postmaster General is wrong, Judge Speer (Jeffersonian Pub. Co. v. West, B. 24) said 
the petitioner "must come before the court with clean bands." 
02 See also Murray v. Hoboken Land and Imp. Co., 18 Hon. 272 and Bushnell v. 
Leland, 164 U. S. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW. 
of the department is accepted as final by the courts, and even when 
involving questions of law this action is attended by a strong pre· 
sumption of its correctness."33 
Two Constitutional objections were raised in· Congress to Title 
XII which did not come before the courts: (I) That Title XII 
denied the right of the people to be secure in their papers against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; ( 2) that a practical censorship 
would be created, since publishers would have to consult the Post· 
master General before publishing any questionable matter. The 
former objection was removed by amendment,84 and the latter clearly 
fails to distinguish betwee~ a censorship imposed upon the press by 
law and "a voluntary censorship" so-called, instituted for the conA 
venience of publishers to guide them in their interpretation of their 
-legal duties and to warn them _fro~ possibly dangerous courses. 
III. 
Excr,usroN FROM !N'l'ERSTA'l'E _COMMERCE. 
Title XII may be said to have been completed by Section 19 of 
the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, which reads 
in part as follows : · 
"That ten days after the approval of this Act, and until 
the end of the war, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, 
corporation, or association~ to print, publish, or circulate or 
33 Public Clearing Hwse v. Coyne, 19+ U. S. 497 (1904). See also Bates at1Cl Guild 
Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty; 
187 u. s. 
Further in answering the objection that due process of law was denied when an 
executive official was given authority to control the disposition of property the Court 
in the Coyue case said: "Nor do we think the law unconstitutional because the Post· 
master General may seize and detain all letters, which may include letters of a purely 
personal or domestic character and having no connection whatever with the prohibited 
enterPrise." In view of the fact that by these sections the postmaster is denied permis· 
sion to open any letters not addressed to himself, there would seem to be no possible 
method of enforcing the law except by authorizing him to seize and detain all such let· 
ters. It is true it may occasionally happen that he would detain a letter having no 
relation to the prohibited business; but where a person is engaged in an enterprise of 
this kind, receiving dozens and peihaps hundreds of letters every day, containing re-
mittances or correspondence connected with the prohibited business, it is not too much 
to assume that prima facie at least, all such letters are identified with such business. A 
ruling that ·only" such letters as were obviously connected with the enterPrise could be 
detained would amount to a practical annulment of the law, as it would be quite im· 
possible, without opening and inspecting such letters, which is forbidden, to obtain cvi· 
deuce of the real facts." Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904). See also 
Powell v. PenffSYlvania,- 127 U. S. 678, 685; 32 L. ed. 253, 256, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 
1257; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133. 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499. 
36 The amendment read as follows: "Nothing in this section shall be so construed 
as to authorize any person other than an employee of the dead-letter effice duly author· 
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cause to be printed, published or circulated in any foreign, 
language, any news item, editorial or other printed matter, 
respecting the Government of the United States, or of any 
nation engaged in the present war, its policies, international 
relations, the state or conduct of the war, or any matter 
relating thereto : Provided, that this section shall not apply 
to any print, newspaper or publication, where the publisher, 
or distributor thereof, on or before offering the same for 
mailing or in any manner distributing it to the public, has 
fil{!d with the postmaster at the place of publication, in the 
form of an affidavit, a true and complete translation of the 
entire article containing such matter proposed to be printed, 
in plain type in the English language, at the head of such 
print, newspaper, or publication, the words 'True translation 
filed with the postmaster at . • . . • • on . . • • . • as required oy 
the Act of •.... . ! 
"Any print, newspaper or publication in any foreign lan-
guage which does not con.form to this section is hereby_ de-
clared to be non-mailable, and it shall be unlawful for any · 
person, firm, corporation, or association to transport, carry 
or other·wise pieblish or distribute any matter which is made 
non-mailable by the pro'lli.sions of the act relat·ing to espion-
age, approved lime 15, 1917 = Provided further, that upon 
evidence satisfactory to him that any print, newspaper or 
publication printed in a foreign language may be printed, 
published and distributed free from the foregoing restrictions 
and conditions without detriment to the United States in the 
present war, the President may cause to be issued to the 
printers or publishers of such print, newspaper or publica-
tion, a permit to print, publish and circulate the issue or issues 
of their newspaper· or publication free from such restrictions 
and requirements, such permits to be subject to revocation 
at his discretion. And the Postmaster General shall cause 
cop_ies of all such permits to be furnished to the postmaster 
of the postoffice serving the place from which the print, 
newspaper or publication granted the permit is to emanate. 
"l\.ny person who shall make an affidavit containing any 
ized thereto, to open any letter not addressed to himself." C. R, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 
p. :n62. 
For similar language see 25 Stat. L., 873. 
The seizure of letters in any other way is unlawful: 35 Stat. L., n25. 
The amendment was added to prevent abuse of power by tbe Postmaster General, 
C. R., May 4, 1917. 
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false statement· in connection with the translation provided 
for in this sectio.n shall be guilty of tbe crime of perjury 
·and subject to the punishment provided therefor by section 
one. hundred and twenty-five of the act of March 4th, 190C). 
entitled 'an Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws 
of the United States,' and any person, firm, corporation or 
association violating .any other requirement of this section 
shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more 
than $500, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, 
or in the discretion of the court, may be both fined and im-
prisoned."85 
The Constitutional question raised by these provisions is clear 
from our consideration of the. MASSES Case. In that case the court 
in sustaining Title XII had been at pains to point out that "the act 
of Congress now Ca.Ued in question does not undertake to say that 
certain matters shall not be transmitted in interstate commerce." 
But this is just what the Trading with the Enemy Act does under-
take to say; the question is, therefore, whether Congress has the 
'right to deny published matter the facilities of interstate commerce. 
The theory of the Court in the Jackson Case cited above is clearly 
adverse to any such claim of authority. In that case the Court said: 
"L1·berty of circulating is as essential to that freedom [of the press] 
as liberty of publishing; irideed, without the circulation, the publica-
tion would be of little value; if, therefore, printed matter be ex-
cluded from the mails, its transportation in any other way cannot 
be forbidden by Congress." 
. And in the Rapier Case the language used is of like import even 
though less outspoken.86 Furthermore, even in Chwmpion v. Ames, 
while sustaining the right of Congress to exclude lottery tickets from 
interstate commerce, the Court did so on the theory that such tickets 
were "articles of commerce,'' and it avoided the question also raised 
in that case of Congress's right to exclude lottery advertisements 
from interst~te commerce. 87 
Altogether, therefore, 1 think it has to be admitted that the 
Supreme Court•s position on the question of the exclusion of pub-
lished matter from the channels of interstate commerce is still some-
what doubtful. Nevertheless, the position that the Court must 
finally take is clear enough. Surely there can be no right of circula-
tion in interstate commerce for matter which may be directly 
.. Trading with the Enemy Act, Stat., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 425-426. Italics are mine • 
.. 143' U. S., IIO (1892) • 
.,. 188 u. s. 321 (1902). 
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banned by law. Conceding that Congress had the right to penalize 
the kind of publications which it does penalize by the Espionage 
Act, it had the collateral right to exclude such publications not only 
from the mails but also from interstate commerce. There can be 
no right of circulation for that which there is no right to utter.88 
There is little question of the constitutionality of that section of 
the Trading with the Enemy Act which requires a translation of 
articles written in a foreign language. The primary purpose of the 
section was to make the Espionage Act more easily enforceable. 
The Court, following its usual custom of making large allowances 
for the requirements of administration,39 would probably uphold 
the section. Moreover, it could scarcely be said that any restraint 
is put upon the freedom of the press, since the provision, taken by 
itself, in no wise re~tricts the expression of opinion, but merely 
imposes conditions, compliance with which is necessary before 
papers are allowed to circulate in interstate commerce.~ 
Title XII, has received its most recent extension from the Act of 
May 16, 1918, which, however, is principally important for its addi-
tions to Title I, Section 3 of the Act, which is considered below. 
The provisions of the later act affecting Title XII are the following: 
"That Section l of Title XII and all other provisions of 
the Act entitled 'An Act to prevent interference with the 
foreign COmplerce, etc., of the United States' which apply 
to Section 3 of Title I thereof shall apply with equal force 
and effect to said Section 3 as amended. 
"Section 3. That. Title XII of the said Act of June 15, 
1917, be, and the same is, hereby amended by adding· thereto 
the following Section-(4): 
"The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory 
to him that any person or concern is using the mails in 
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, instruct the 
Postmaster at any postoffice at which the mail is received 
addressed to such person or concern to return to the post-
master at the office at which they were originally mailed all 
letters or other matter so addressed, with the words 'Mail 
"For intimation that Congress m:iy regulate interstate commerce, even though its 
laws are in the nature of police regulations sec Hoke and Economides v. U.S., :z27 U. S.; 
Hommer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 
"See Crone v. Campbell, :z45 U. S.; Otis v. Porker, 187 U. S.; Miller v. Oregon, 
:zo8 U. S.; Sil:: v. Hcslerberg, :zn U. S.; McDermott v. Wis., :z:zS U. S. 
••In Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan (:z:z9 U. S.) the Court upheld the Newspaper Pub· 
licity Law (37 Stat. L. 553), which imposed restrictions upon the press. 
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. ' 
to this address undeliverable under the Espionage Act' plainly 
written or stamped upon the outside thereof, and all such 
letters or other matter so returned to such postmasters shall 
be by them returned to the· senders thereof under such reg-
ulations as the Postmaster General may describe."41 ' 
. The chief question here raised is as to the scope and intention of 
the new provision. Is it preventive and protective merely, .or is it 
punitive?. If the intention of Congress is to penalize the violation 
of the Espionage Act 'by this measure, Section 4 is clearly uncon-
~,titutional as amounting to a denial of trial by jury. But the adop-
tion of such a provision to'prevent further violations of the law 
and to aid in its enforcement presents merely the question just con-
sidered in connection with the requirements of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, that certain matter published in a foreign language 
be accompanied by a translation in English. It may be added that 
the Fraud Order Act of 1913, the validity of which is, as we have 
seen, fully established, employs language which is almost identical 
with that of the section under consideration. 
From this discussion it is clea:r that the use of the mails is, to 
some extent, a revocable privilege, subject to regulation by Congress. 
By authorization of Congress, the Postmaster General may exercise 
large discretion in determining what shall be transmitted through 
the mails : provided always that he acts within the jurisdiction 
conferred upon him. Congressional authority is also validly exer-
cised in excluding certain matter from interstate commerce. Ex-
clusion of matter from the mails and from interstate commerce alike 
is clearly within the power of Congress, if such action is necessary 




So far we have dealt with those provisions of the Espionage Act 
which are intended primarily to govern the circulation of matter, 
and we have stated the general conclusion that the right of circula-
tion is collateral to the right of publication, and that, accordingly, 
there can be 110 right of circulation where there is no right of pub-
lication or utterance. We now turn to Section 3 of Title I of the 
same Act, which is designed directly to curb certain kinds of utter-
ances. It reads as _follows: 
u Public No. 150, 65th Cong. (H. R. 8753). 
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"Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall will-
fully make or convey false statements with intent to inter-
fere with the operations or success of the United States or 
to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the 
United States is at' war, shall willfully cause or attempt to 
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty 
in the military or naval forces of the United State_s, or shall 
willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the 
United States, to the injury of the service of the United 
States, shall be punished 1by a fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisonment for not more than 20 years or both."42 
Though these provisions, as I have indicated, touch immediately 
the matter of freedom of utterance under the Constitution, they 
called forth; curiously enough, very little discussion on the floors of 
Congress. They have, on the other hand, come under judicial 
scrutiny in a great number of cases, to which, therefore, we may 
tum for further light upon the constitutional question. For not only 
have the courts uniformly upheld this section, but they have con-
strued its terms liberally from the point of view of authority 
rather than otherwise; and they have done this, it must be presumed, 
with the elementary rule in mind, that it is the duty of the courts 
to construe statutes, if possible, so as to keep them within Con-
stitutional limitations. Our review of ·the cases may- well begin_ 
with some general considerations underlying them all.43 
The defendant in a criminal action, we are more than once re-
minded in these cases, is presumed to be innocent until his guilt 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the fact that an indict-
ment has been brought against him is no evidence of his guilt. 44 
To the benefit of this presumption each defendant is entitled unless, 
or until, it have been removed by evidence proving his guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The burden is, therefore, on the Government 
of establishing every essential element of the crime charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt, which "is a doubt growing reasonably out of the 
evidence or lack of it." It is, in other words, "not a captious doubt; 
"Stat., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., :.118. 
"The renew of these cases is based upon the Department of Justice Bulletins (here-
,after referred to as "B"). It has been charged that the Department of Justice has 
attempted to infiuence judicial decisions by suppressing those which were contrary to the 
Attorney General's interpretation of the law. A few such cases are cited in Nelles, 
Es/iionage Act Cases, but the evidence does not seem conclusive. 
"U. S. v. Harper, B. 76, p. ,-; U. S. v. Gneiser et cJ., B. 71, p. 2; U. S. v. Wolf, 
B. 81, p. 3; U. SI. v. H. G. Mackley, B. 83, p. 1; U. S. v, Schenk et al., B. 43; U, S, v. 
Pierce, B. 52; U. S. v. Baltzer, B. 3. 
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not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the- unfortunate 
position of the defendant or the dislike to accept the responsibility 
of convicting a fellow man." If accordingly, having weighed the 
evidence on both sides, one reaches the conclusion that a defendant 
is guilty to that degree of certainty that would lead one on to act 
on the faith of it in. the most iniportant and critical affairs of one's 
life, one may properly vote for conviction. Proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not 
proof beyond the possibility of a mistake. If such were the stand-
ard of evidence required, most criminals would go unwhipped of 
justice.45 
~ · The jury, in considering the evidence, is, of course, to maintain 
an impartial and unbiased judgment.°'6 Judge Day charged the jury: 
"To no extent are you to be influenced by any bias on the one hand 
or prejudice on the other hand that may arise from extraneous 
considerations or from your sympathies for or against the defend-
ant personally or for or against the United States in its efforts to 
enforce the criminal laws."u Such instructions were generally 
given in the Espionage cases. 
A material element of the criines punished by Section 3 is the 
intent with which the acts there enumerated are per£ ormed. What 
is intent? "Intent," says the court in one of these cases, "in doing 
an act, speaking words, or writing them, . . . is made up, among 
other things, of what a person thinks and desires and wishes to 
accomplish or to bring about by means of the· doing of the act, 
or the speaking of the words, or the writing'' (of them) .48 In short, 
intent means "the conscious expectation of the effect to be pro-
duceci.""0 
But naturally, it is impossible to enter into the mind of man and 
determine by any sort of scientific demonstration what he expects 
to accomplish. So at this point the law steps in and says that a man 
.. U. S. v. Ycutrey, 91 F~d. 868; 
" Some of the criticism directed against the enforcement of the act is due to the 
fact that the jurors' minds have been inflamed by appeals to patriotism and by constant 
reminders from the U. S. attorneys that the Act must be strictly enforced. 
See in this connection Annual Report of the Attorney General (1918), p. 673-
No. 82+ 
41 U. S. v. Gneiser, B. 71, p. r. 
See also U. S. v. Balti:er et al., B· 3, p. lo; U. S. v. Mar Easftr.an, ·"Espionage Act 
Cases", p. 29. 
It may be remarked that Mr. Nelles' book, "Espionage Act Cases", was produced 
with the evident purpose of influencing opinion in favor of a milder interpretation of 
the law. With this purpose in view, only certain sections of the cases reported in the 
Bulletins are given, and cases not elsewhere reported are treated at length. 
'" U. S. v. Clinton H. Pierce, B. 52, p. 18. 
"'See U. S. v. Floyd Ramp, B. 66; U. S. v. Huhn, B. 58. 
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is presumed to intend the reasonable and natural consequences of 
his acts, and that a man can not say or do a thing that will have 
certain consequences and then say he did not intend them. As 
various judges have put it: If the natural consequences of a defend-
ant's language is calculated to produce the effect of causing disloyalty 
-then there may be indulged a ptesumption that that was his n-
tention. But that is not a conclusive presumption.50 This pre-
'sumption is one of fact, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
and it may •be said to apply to one's words as well as to one's acts.51 
Questions of fact under the Espionage Act are, of course, . de-
termined by the jury. It is evident, therefore, that the jury must 
decide whether the natural, reasonable and proba:ble effect of a 
statement would be the unlawful things forbidden by the act, which 
in turn is a question to be resolved in light of all the circumstances 
of the case.62 In this connection the words of Judge Amidon in his 
charge to the jury in the Brinton Case, are pertinent: 
''You can tell what was in Mr. Brinton's mind ... by 
weighing his speech, his language, the occasion upon which 
it was spoken, and then say, under your oaths, as an infer~ 
ence ·from it, whether he was actuated -by that purpose or 
not."58 
The point may also be illustrated concretely. Thus Mrs. Stokes 
was convicted for saying in public print: "No government which 
is for profiteers can· also be for the people, and I am for the people, 
while the government is for the profiteers."5' On the other hand, 
J ttdge Hook in granting a new trial to one Charles Doll said: 
"The crimes were charged to have been committed June 
20, 1917, by the use of language which was too profane 
and obscene to be set forth in this opinion. It was quite 
clearly shown at the trial that the accus~d was under the 
influence of liquor and had or thought he had a grievance 
against the government over a right to timber from a forest 
'"Sec U. S. v. William Denson, B. 142; U. S. v. Windmuller, B. 112; U. S. 
v. Stet•ens, B. 116; U. S. v. Goldsmith, B. 133; U. S. v. Wallace, B. 4; U. S. v, 
O'Hare, B. 49; U. S. v. Williams, B. 118; U. S. v. Pierce, B. 52; U. s, v, U-'aldron, 
B. 79; U. S. v. Mackley, B. 83. 
""See U. S. v. Fontana, B. 148; U. S. v. Prieth, B. 156; U. S. v. Shoeber, B, 149, p, 3. 
12 U.S. v. Weinberg, B. 123; U.S. v. Bussel, B. 131. 
03 U.S. v. Briton, B. 132, p. 8. See also: U.S. v. Spillner, B. 145; U. s:v, Martin, 
B, 15,.; U. S. v. Henrickson, B. 86; U. S. v. Frerichs, B. 85; U. S. v. Pundt, B. 82; 
U. S. v. Fosler, B. 8,.; U. S. v. Sugarman, B. 12. 
" U. S. v. Stokes, B. 1~6, p. 2. 
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reservation. The language was used in a conversation with 
two forest officers to whom he made his complaints. It ap-
peared that at the time the officers were also engaged in 
recruiting for the Engineer Military service, but the fact 
was not told the accused nor did he know it • . • We think 
there was nothing in this ca,se fairly indicating that the 
accused intended the results which are the essential elements 
of the offenses or that such results in fact followed or would 
naturally follow what he said."55 
It will be seen that the expressions of Doll were much stronger 
than those of Mrs. Stok~s, but the circumstances proved that tlie 
intent of the latter was penal, while that of the former was not. 
We may' now turn more particularly to the section under dis-
cussion. It is needless to say that after April 6, 1917, the United 
States was at war with Germany. We may, then, confine our atten-
tion to the criminal acts covered by the section and to a definition 
of its terms. 
It is clear that three classes of ·acts constitute crimes under these 
provisions. The first consists in the willful making or conveying 
false reports or statements with the intent specified. The second 
is the willful causing or attempting to cause in.subordination, mutiny, 
or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United 
States. The third consists in willfully obstructing the recruiting 
or enlistment service of the United States. Let us consider these 
crimes seriatim. 
The first crime is willfully making or conveying false statements, 
etc., with the intent to interfere with the operation or success of the 
military or naval forces of the United States. The. falsity of the 
statement being shown, the intent is the essential element of the 
crime. As I have shown, the intent is determined from the char-
acter of the utterance and the circumstances under which it was 
made.511 ''Willfully" is defined to mean willingly, purposely, in-
teptionally, as contradistinguished from accidentally or inadvert-
ently: it emphasizes the notion of intent.57 
Since the making of false reports or statements with the specified 
intent is made illegal, it is important to know what the courts class 
as false statements. It is generally conceded that 
" U. S. v. Charles Doll, B. 163, pp. 1·2. 
11 Supra, note 52. 
st U. S. v. Waldron, B. 79, p. 5; U. S. v. Pierce, l!. 52, p. 17. 
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"A false report or statement, as used here, means a state-
ment as to some past or existing fact. It would not ~nclude 
a mere opinion, a prophecy or a wish, or a hope, because 
those are not statements of fact."38 
But the line between these two categories is not always clear. 
Judge Munger thought Claude Bunyard could not be held guilty 
'Under this clause for saying: "This is a rich man's war, and a poor 
man's battle"; but some other judges would probably have taken a 
more rigorous view.39 The sanie difficulty is further illustrated by 
the cases which concerned statements about the motive of our , 
entrance into the war. Opinions might vary about that. Neverthe-
less, some judges have ruled that there is a definite criterion of 
truth in the matter. Thus Judge Jack in a charge to the jury states: 
''You will note that Congress assigned for its reason for 
the adoption of the resolution (of war) that the Imperial 
German Government had committed repeated acts of war 
against the Government and people of the United States of 
America. Congress but recited historical facts well known 
to all who read the newspapers and keep up with current 
events. 
"It is not for you to question the correction of this finding 
and declaration of Congress, but you should accept it as 
correctly stating the cause for the entrance of the United 
States into the war."60 
It is perhaps safe to state that one can not affirm without consid-
erable risk that we went into the war from unworthy motives. 
One other question which arises in connection with the crime of 
making false statements is, Who compose the "military and naval 
forces of the United States"? In this particular connection, the. 
phrase has been very broadly construed, much more broadly than 
in connection with the two ensuing clauses of the section. Thus 
Judge 'Wooley says: 
"The controlling word of the statute is interference, and 
if the intent with which the false statements are made is to 
work such interference, it matters little whether-that end is 
11 U. S. v. Frerichs, B. S.5, p. 6. See also: U. S. v. Hall, ::48 Fell. 156; Masses Pub. 
Co. v. Patten, Nelles, Espionage Cases, p. ;n; U. S. v. Zimmerman, Nelles, p. 10. 
• U. S. v. Bunyard, B. 168, p. :r. 
eo U. S. v. Harper, B. 76, p. 3, The same is implied in U. S. v. Pierce, B. 52; 
U, S. v. Stokes, B. 106. 
a U. S. v. Stevens, B. n6, p. 7. See also U. S. v. Koenig, B. 123. 
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reached directly or indirectly. In other words, so far as the 
first crime is concerned, to interfere with the success of the 
country by destroying, or weakening, or undermining any 
recognized and properly adapted instrumentality or organiza-
tion which effectively aids in and contributes to that success 
is' to interfere with the success of the military forces within 
the meaning of this statute."61 
Subs~antially the ~ame opinion is expressed or implied in nearly 
every judicial utterance dealing with the crime of making false state-
ments with the specified intent. 
To conclude, therefore--The first offense punished by Section 3 
of Title I of° the Espionage Act consists in purposely making false 
statements of fact with the design, as shown by the circumstances, 
of interfering directly or indirectly with any organized and recog-
nized agency of the Government that is engaged in pushing the war 
to .a successful conclusion. 
The second· offense, in the language of the statute, consists in 
'willfully causing or attempting to cause insubordination, mutiny or 
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States.' 
It will not be necessary to repeat the definitions I have given, except 
that of "the military and naval forces of the United States." 
One view has it that the military and naval forces include those 
who have been examined, accepted and enrolled as soldiers.62 This 
is the narrowest meaning that has been given .the term and but few 
judges have so interpreted the statute. 
The preponderant opinion is that the "military forces" as the 
term is used in this part of the section, include those who have 
registered and who have received their serial numbers. Judge 
Westenhaver, in defining the term, says: 
"For the purpose of this act and this offense, I say to 
you that all such persons thus registered and enrolled and 
thus subject from time to time to be called intq active serv-
ice are a part of the military forces of the United States."68 
02 U. S. v. Britton, B. 132; U. S. v. Mayer, B. 156; U. S. v Frerichs, B. 85; 
U. S. v. Fontana, B. 148; U. S. v. Hall, 248 Fed. 150. 
a U. S. v. Debs, B. 155, p. 6. See also: 30 Stat., 361; U.· S. v. S-ugannan, B. 12; 
U. S. v. Reeder, B. 161; U. S. v. Harper, B. 76; U. S. v. Waldron, B. 79; U, S. v. 
Rhuberg, B. 94; U. S. v. :Miller, B. 104; U. S. v. Stokes, B. 106; U. S. v. Sandvick, 
B. u3; U. S. v. Graham, B. r20. In U. S. v. Fontana, B. 148, the court intimates that 
the registrants must have been accepted before they can be said to be in the military 
f~rces. In the majority of cases, however an attempt to arouse physical resistance to the 
draft would be within this clause. 
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Under other judges a yet wider application has been given the 
term. Judge Hamilton declares: "The military forces of the 
United States means all the able bodied men of the United States,"6i 
a view which still other judges have curtailed somewhat by con-
fining it to men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five.6u 
But by what methods, in what way, may one cause or attempt 
to cause insubordination, etc.? Not merely by acts, in the conven-
tional sense of the term, but by words as well, written or spoken, 
answer the courts.66 Nor is the truth or falsity of a statement 
material to the offenses recognized by this and the ensuing clause 
of the section; their tendency and intent are their important in-
gredients. 
"If," says Judge Amidon of certain defendants, "they dis-
seminated printed matter which, though it might be historic-
ally true, still, as a natural result, would tend to accomplish 
things forbidden by law, and the act was done with willful 
intent to accomplish those results, it would be a crime."61 
In brief, then, any utterance tending to incite insubordination, 
etc., on the part of men registered and enrolled in the service of the 
United States, would offend against the second clause of Section 3, 
unless the circumstances surrounding the utterance clearly estab-
lished the lack of criminal intent. 
The third crime covered by Section 3 is the willful obstruction of 
the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the in-
jury of the service of the United States. Any obstruction of the 
recruiting would be to the injury of the service, so we may omit 
consideration of that point. We have to consider, then, the meaning 
of the phrase, "obstruction" of the "recruiting and enlistment serv-
ice." 
The word "obstruct" is defined to mean to hinder, to embarrass, 
to make progrep;s more difficult or slow, and in its broadest use 
means active opposition to the recruiting and enlistment service of 
the United States by advising or counseling others not to enlist.08 
In other words, no act of violence is required to complete the of-
fense; it may be consummated by mere words spoken or written.69 
61 U. S. v. Capo, B. 37, p. 5. 
15 U. S. v. Kirschner, B. 69; U. S. v. Hicks, B. 160; U. S. v. Herman, B. 109• 
es U. S. v. Wallace, B. 4, p. S· 
OT U. S. v. Wishek, B. 153, p. 5. See also: U. S. v. O'Hare, B. 49; U. S. v, Prieth, 
B. 156; U. S. v. Film Ct>., B. 33. 
es U. S. v. Waldron, B. 79, p. 7 • 
.. U. S. v. Wi11dmuller, B. 1u; O'Hare v. U, S., B. 165; U. S. v. Freiricks, B, 85; 
U. S. v. Stokes, B 106. 
As Justice Holmes, in· Debs v. U. S., says: "" " " If a part or the manifest foten· 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
What is the "recruiting and enlistment service" ? In the first 
pJace it is composed of "all instrumentalities and officers in charge 
thereof."70 But it extends, further, to voluntary enlistment. Thus, 
Judge Munger states, it may be an obstruction of the enlistment 
service if "statements are made to those who may enlist, the natural 
and reasonable· eff e.cts of which would be, if believed, to discourage, 
delay, or hinder, even if it did not finally prevent those persons 
from eitlis?ng in the :Army or Navy."71 And, of course, interfer-
ence with the operation of the draft laws is obstruction of the re-
cruiting service, wherefore the courts have generally held that to 
persuade young men not to answer draft notices is an obstruction 
of recruiting. This position has recently been sustained by the 
Supreme Court. 72 
. ·We may sum up the third crime, then, by saying that the courts 
. have held it illegal intentionally to check, retard or make slow, by 
word or deed, either the draft or voluntary enlistment,78 or to 
interfere with the officers and agencies of either. 
·Section 3 of Title I of the original Espionage Act was greatly ex-
tended by an amendment which. became law on May 16th, 1918. 
The amende4 section reads as follows,. the newer portions of the sec-
tion being included in brackets : 
"Whoever, when the United •States is at war, shall willfully 
make or convey false reports or statements with intent to in-
terfere with the operation or success of the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its 
~nemies, [or shall. willfully or convey false reports or false 
statements-, or say or do anything, ex~ept by way of bona 
fide and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with 
intent to obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds or 
tion of the more general utterances was to encourage those present to obstruct the re-
cruiting service, and if in pa'ssages such encouragement was directly given, the immunity 
of the general theme may not be enough to protect the speech." Quoted U. S. v. 
Nearing, B. 198, p. 7. 
"' U. S. v. Stokes, B. 106, p. II. 
n U. S. v. Frerichs, B. 85, p. 9. See also U. S. v. Elmer, B. 171. That one may 
be convicted of conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion is plainly stated 
in Schenk v. U. S., B. 194, p • .;. 
"'Schenk v. U. S., B. 194' p. 4. See also: U. S. V\ Capo, B. 3?; U. S. v, Taubert, 
B. 108; U. S. v. Wolf, B. 81; U. S. v. Rhuberg, B. 107; U. S. v, Hitt, B. 53. Als<> 
indieated in U. S. v. Schenk, B. 43; U- S. v. Doe, B. 55. It is argued that an intcrfer· 
ence with the draft is not punishable under this clause, because clause :z, section :z, deals 
with the same subject. This is not a ulid argument because obstruction of the draft is 
not the only subject covered by this clause. U. S. v. Prieth, B. 130, p. 7 • 
.. U. S. v. Frerichs, B. 85; U. S. v. Henricksen, B. 86; U. S. v. Pierce, 245 
Fed. 878. 
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other securities of the United States or the making of loans 
by or to the United States], and whoever, when the United 
States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause 
(or incite) insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of 
duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or 
shall willfully obstruct [or attempt to obstruct] the recruit-
ing or enlistment service of the United States [and whoever, 
'when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter,. 
print, write or publish any disloyal, _profane, scurrilous or 
abusive language about the form of government. of the United 
States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, 
or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the army 
or navy of the United States or any language calculated to 
bring the form of government of the United States, the Con-
stitution of the United States, or the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or the uniform of the army 
or navy of tjle United States, into contempt, scorn, con-
tumely or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write 
or publish any language intended to incite, provoke or en-
courage resistance to the United States or to promote the 
cause of its enemies or shall willfully display the flag of any 
foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance, writing, print-
ing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite or advocate 
any curtailment of production in this country of any thing 
or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the 
prosecution of the war in which the United States may be 
engaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder 
the United States in the prosecution of the war, and whoever 
shall willfully advocate, favor, teach, def end or suggest the 
doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated, 
and whoever sh!J.ll by word or act support or favor the cause 
of any country With which the United States is at war, or by 
word or act oppose the cause of the United State~ tP.erein; 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $ro,ooo or im-
prisonment for not more than twenty years, or both: Pro-
vided that 
"Any employee or official of the United •States government 
who commits any disloyal act or utters any unpatriotic or 
disloyal language, or who, in an abusive and violent manner 
criticizes the Army or Navy or the flag of the United States, 
shall be dismissed from the service. Any such employee shall 
be dismissed by the head of the department in which the em-
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ployee may be engaged, and any such official shall be dismiss-
ed by the authority having power to appoint a successor to 
the dismissed official]. "1~ 
While the measure was pending in the Senate, Mr. France of 
Maryland sought to qualify its rigors with the following proviso : 
"Provided, however, that nothing in this act shall be con-
strued as limiting the liberty or impairing the right of any in-
dividual to publish or speak what is true with good motives 
and for justifiable ends."76 
The proviso passed the Senate, but at the request of the Attorney 
.General was stricken out in conference. 
"Experience teaches," urged the Attorney Gen~ral, "that 
such an amendment would to a great degree nullify the value 
of the law and tum every trial into an academic discussion 
on insoluble riddles as to what is true. Human motives are 
too complicated to be discu~sed,76 and the word justifiable is 
too elastic for practical use."77 
It will be noted that the first crime covered by the amendment of 
May, I9I8, is "maki~g false statements with the intent to obstruct 
the sale of United States bonds," etc. There is some reason for 
holding that the obstruction of the sale of bonds was covered by the 
14 Public Document No. 150, 65th Congress (H. R. 8753). 
The proviso amounts to a recommendation and need not be considered here. It was 
aimed especially at George Creel, Chairman of the Committee on Public Information. 
,.. C. R., 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6517, April 25, 1918. 
The introduction of new words into the law covers defects in the old law (Louis-
"Uille a1'd Nash"Uille R. R. Co. v. Motley, 219 U. S.). Persons convicted under the law 
of 1917 for crimes enumerated in the amendment of May, 1918, may appeal their cases, 
on the grounn that such ·crimes were not contemplated by the law of June 15, 1917. 
Whether the Supreme Court would grant new trials on this basis is doubtful in view of 
the tttterance in ScMnk v. U. S., B. 194, p. + 
••In showing that motive differed from intent, the words of Judge Howe, in U. S. 
v. Waldron, B. 79, p. 6, were given as a correct statement of law: "You should be care-
ful not to mix motives with intent. Motive is that which leads to an act; intent grati· 
fies it. A crime may be committed with both a good and an evil motive. To illustrate: 
The father of a large family steals bread for his starving children and also to deprive 
the owner of its value. He has two moµves, one is good and one is evil, but he is 
guilty, notwithstanding he has a good motive as well as an evil motive, for he must not 
steal at all." See also: Warner v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 29 Fed. 387; Johnson v. U. S., 
r57 U. S. 325; Williamson v. U. S., 207 U. S. 425; People v. Molineau~, 61 E. E. 286. 
tt C. R., 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6518, May 4, 1918. The letters are well worth 
reading. They show (1) the necessity for such a law and (2) the influence of the Ad· 
ministration over Congress. 
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original act of June, 1917. For example, Judge Wooley thus 
charged a jury: 
"But if you find that the words constitute a false statement 
of fact, as distinguished from mere opinion, and that their 
natural and probable consequences, in being addressed to 
·Mable P. Van Trump, were, if heeded, to prevent or deter 
her by persuasion or alarm from pursuing her activity in 
seeking subscriptions for liberty bonds, and thereby to ob-
struct their sale to that extent and thereby to interfere to that 
extent with the Government in getting money with which to 
operate the military forces, then I say to you, that you find 
the prisoner intended such consequence, and that, the words 
being false and willfully spoken with that intent, he has com-
mitted the offense forbidden ,by the statute and your verdict 
should be 'guilty'."78 , -
However, a sufficient number of judges took the narrower view 
to cause the Department of Justice to wish the insertion of this 
clause in the latter act. 
The words "or say or do anything, except by way of bona fide 
and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with intent to 
obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds or other securities 
of the United States, or the making of loans by or to the United 
States,'' give the substance of the crime. As always, intent is the 
material element of the offense, an:d must be determined from the 
circumstances in which something is said or done. The word 
"obstruct" has essentially the meaning given above-to impede, or, 
hinder, or delay, or embarrass. "Obstructfon," says Judge Mun-
ger, "would include mere delay as well as final refusal."79 
The second new element introduced into the bill is making the 
attempt to obstruct the recruiting and enlistmept service a crime. 
It had been widely held before the passage of the amendment that 
the obstruction must 'be actual,80 however inconsiderable; that, in 
other words, some real obstruction must ,be shown to have followed 
the words or acts. It is true that some judges had taken a broader 
view, holding that words spoken or acts done with intenf to obstruct 
n U. S. v. Frank Stevens, B. 116, p. 6. See ante, discussion of "military forces." 
" U. S. v Brackett, B. r70, p. 2. See also the discussion supra, of obstruction of 
recruiting and Schenk v. U. S., B. r94, p. 4 
80 U. S. v. Zimmerman, Nelles, Espionage Cases, p. r4; U. S. v. P11ndt, B. 82; U. S. 
v. Orlando Hitt, B. 53; U. S. v. Ves. Hall, 248 Fed. r50. 
Other references are given in connection with the third crime of the original Title 
I, Sec. 3, supra. · 
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were punishable, but there were enough who took the narrower 
view to cause the Attorney General to recommend ·that the am-
biguifi be _s:leared up. As the law now stands, the degree of suc-
cess of an attempt is not important. 81 
But some courts had held that the appeal to ·resist the law must 
be "direct." Thus, Judge Learned Hand, in Masses Pub. Co. v. Pat-
- ten, says: 
"If one stopg short of urging upon others that it is their 
duty or to their interest to resist the law, it seems to me 
that one should not be held to have attempted to cause its 
violation. If that be not the test, I can see no escape from 
the conclusion that, under this section, every political agi-
tation which can be shown to ·he apt to create a seditious 
temper is illegru. I am confident that by such language Con-
gress. had no such revolutionary purpose in view."82 
Judge Rogers, however, in the Circuit Court of Appeals, took 
the opposite view in the following unequivocal words: . .. 
"If the natural arid reasonable effect of what is said is 
to encourage resistance to the law, and the words are used 
in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial 
that the duty to resist is not mentioned or that it is to the 
interest of the person is not suggested. That one may will-
11 See: U. S. v. Prieth, B. 156; U. S. v. Debs, B. 155, p. 7. 
In the former case, under the act of June 15, 7917, and in the latter, under the 
amendment of May 18, 1918, the criminal intent is emphasized. In these cases the jury 
would determine from circumstances whether the criminal intent was present. 
82 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 540. 
Judge Hand had already spoken as follows: "One may not counsel or advise others 
to violate the law as .it stands. Words arc not only the keys of persuasion, but the 
' triggers of action, and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of the 
Jaw cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the 
final source of government in a democratic state • • " To counsel or advise a man to 
an act is to urge upon him that it is his interest or his duty to do it. While of course, 
this may be accomplished as well by indirection as expressly, since words carry the mean-
ing that they impart, the definition is exhaustive, I think, and r shall use it. Political agi. 
tation by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men 
to the violation of law. Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forci-
ble resistance of the authority which puts them in execution, and it would be folly to 
disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as 
, such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tol~rance of all 
methods of political, agitation which, in normal times. is a safeguard of :Cree government. 
The distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight 
for freedom, and the purpose to disregard it must be evident when the power exists. 
Ibid., p. 540. See also U. S. v. Zimmerman, Nelles, p. 14; U. S. v. Hitt, B. 53; 
U. S. v. Pundt, B. 82. 
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fully obstruct the enlistment service, without advising in 
direct language against enlistments and without stating that 
to refrain from enlistment is a duty or is in one's interest, 
seems to us too plain for controversy."88 
It would seem that the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the Debs Case endorsed the position taken by Judge Rogers. After 
reviewing the speech, Justice Holmes said: 
"If that r the obstruction of the recruiting service] was 
intended and if, in all the circumstances, that would have 
been the probable effect, it would not have been protected 
by reason of its being part of a general program and an 
expression of a general and conscientious belief."SS& 
It is the criminal intent, then, that is emphasized, and the intent 
is to be determined by the jury in every case. 
The third offense covered by the amendment consists in will-
fully uttering "profane, scurrilous or a:busive language about the 
form of government of the United States, the flag of the United 
States or the military or naval forces of the United States. or any 
language intended to bring them into contempt, scorn, contumely, 
or disrepute." Obviously, the intent qualifies the entire crime. 
Thus, Judge Sanford, in a charge to the jury, asks: 
"Now, if he used the language (admitted to be profane 
and abusive), did he use it intending thereby to bring the 
military forces . . . into contempt, disrepute or scorn ?"u 
It is interesting to note in connection with this clause· that abuse 
of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy, if profane, etc., and uttered with the intent forbidden by 
the statute, would probably be punishable under this statute.85 
The fourth crime consists in "willfully uttering language intended 
to incite, provoke or encourage resistance to the United States or 
to promote the cause of its enemies." 
13 J.fa.rses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 38. See also: Wharton, Criminal Law, (nth 
ed.), Sec. 266; Bishop on Criminal Law, Sec. 641; Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox's C. C. 288. 
13& Debs v. U. S., B. 196, p. 3. 
"U. S. v. Marlin, B. i57, p. 6. See also U. S. v. Vevig, B. 162; U. S. v. Equi, 
B. 172. . 
11 Judge Sanford, in U. S. v. Marlin, B. 157, p. 6, said: "I charge you that a state-
ment made concerning the President in his capacity as Commander·in·Chiei of the Army 
and Navy would be a statement made concerning the military and naval forces within the 
meaning of the statute.'' 
It was feared by many at the time of the adoption of this amendment that the law 
would prevent criticism of the President. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
What is meant by "resistance"? Judge Bean, in defining the 
term, says: 
"The element of direct, active opposition by quasi-forcible 
means is required to. constitute the offense of resisting the 
United States under this provision of the law." 
He then defines "promote" thus : 
"To promote means to help, to give aid, assistance to the 
enemies of the United States in waging the war. The cause 
of the enemies of the United States means any and all of 
their military measures taken or carried on for the purpose 
of winning the war against the United States."86 
The crime of displaying the flag of any foreign enemy is too 
clear to need discussion. It is taken to be an evidence of disloy-
alty and punished as such. 
The willful advocacy of the curtailment of production in the 
country of products essential to the prosecution of the war is also 
made illegal by this amendment, i~ the intent is to hinder the United 
States in the prosecution of the war.87 The clause is plainly adapted 
to .Punishing individuals who, under guise of advocating a better 
policy, advise the slackening up in the manufacture or production 
of war material. The next crime demands no discussion; it is evi-
dent that, where acts themselves are illegal, the willful advocacy 
of them may also be made so. 
The l.!1st crime mentioned in this section is the supporting or 
favoring the cause of any country with which the United States 
""U. S. v. Marie Equi, B. 172, p. 14. 
BT The curtailment of production by violence is dealt with by the: Sabotage Act, 
April :zo, 1918 (Report of the Attorney General, 1918, p. 677) as follows: 
Sec. :z. "That when the United States is at war, whoever with intent to injure, in· 
terfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or 
Clltrying on war, or whoever, with reason to believe that his act may injure, interfere 
with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying 
on war, shall willfully injure or destroy or shall attempt to so injure or destroy, any war 
material, 'l\·ar lpremises, or war utilities. as herein defined, shall, upon conviction thereof, 
he fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both." 
Sec. 3. "That when the United States is at war, whoever, with intent to injure, 
interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or 
carrying on the war, or whoever, with reason to believe that his act may injure, inter· 
fere with or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carry· 
ing on the war, shall willfully make or cause to be made in a defective manner, or at· 
tempt to make or cause to be made in a defective manner, any war material, as herein 
defined, or any tool, implement, machine, utensil or receptacle, used or employed in 
making, producing, manufacturing, or repairing any such war material, as herein defined, 
shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not 
more than 30 years, or both." 
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is at war, or by word or act opposing the cause of the United States 
therein. Interpreting this clause, Judge Munger says.: 
"To favor the cause of any enemy country under this 
statute means that what is said supports the object and pur-
pose of the enemy in the war; that which the enemy seeks 
to attain. And to oppose the cause of the United States 
means that one by his words is opposing the object of the 
United States in this war."88 
There has been much discussion whether this clause prohibits 
criticism of the conduct of the war. The language of one judge 
on this point is as follows: 
"The law does not forbid differences of opinion or rea-
sonable discussion as to the causes which induced Congress 
to declare war, or as to the results to be attained by the war, 
or at the end of the war, nor the time and conditions under 
which the war should be brought to an end, nor any reason-
able and tempered discussions and differences of opinion 
upon any or all of the measures or policies adopted in carry-
ing on the war. The law is limited to making it a crime to 
oppose by word or act the military measures taken by the 
United States or under lawful authority by the officers of 
the United States for the purpose of prosecuting the war 
to a successful end."811 
Such an interpretation cannot, I think, be considered other than 
moderate and necessary under the existing. conditions.90 
11 U. S. v. Bunyard, B. 168, p. 4. 
• U. S. v. Marie Equi, B. 172, p. 15. See also U. S. v. Brackl'lt, B. 170; U. S, 
v. Bunyard, B. 168. 
90 Perhaps this careful limitation of the terms of the amendment was due largely to 
the Attorney General. who required the submission of the, facts to the department before 
a case was instituted. These instructions are contained in the report cf ·the Attorney 
General (1918), p. 674. 
Some criticism was directed at the Attorney General for urging the people to report 
violations of the Act, on the ground that such an invitation gave opportunity to cause 
trouble for personal reasons. The criticism was just (see Report of Attorney General, 
19r8, p. 673). Recently, however, the department has announced the policy of accept· 
ing reports of villlations of the law only from its own investigators. 
In 1918, 988 cases were commenced under the Act. 366 convictions followed, while 
Si' were acquitted, 51 discontinued, 21 dismissed or 1C1.uashed. 197 pleas of guilty were 
entered, 222 trials by jury were held and 496 were pending at the close of the year. 
The fines of these amounted to $163,843.89. (Report of Attorney General, 1918, p. 156.) 
That of the 363 convictions there were 197 pleas of guilty shows that there were com-
paratively few cases in which there could have been an error in judging the facts. The 
injustice which certain papers, such as the Nation, are charging against the department 
could scarcely be said to have been very great. Certainly the benefits in checkin"g utter· 
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As was said above, it is an elementary rule of construction that 
a law must be construed so as to bring it within constitutional lim-
itations.91 We have just seen what scope the courts have been 
ready to accord the Espionage Act; but it will still be in place to 
consider some more direct expressions upon the constitutional ques-
tion raised by the Act in relation to the First Amendment. Judge 
Neterer stated the general principle involved as follows: 
"All citizens are free to express their views on all public 
questions so long as they are actuated by honest purposes 
and not for the purpose of transgressing the rights of others, 
the laws of the states, or obstructing by force the execution 
of the laws of the United States; but no person has a right 
to convert the liberty of speech into a license or to carry it 
to a point wher,e it interferes with the due execution of the 
law, where his opposition is not honest, and where he is 
not actuated by an intention of expressing his views, but is 
manifested py an intent to violate the rights of others or 
the laws of the United States."92 
Somewhat more specifically, hvo general limitations upon free-
dom of speech are recogtiized as having been imposed by the Es-
pionage Act to prevent liberty's becoming license. 
In the first place, one is forbidden to advise another to resist a 
law of the United States; and one who a:buses his right of free 
speech to this extent must, say the courts, take the consequences 
of his own temerity. In the words of Judge Wolverton: 
"Neither the right of the citizen to resort to the courts 
for redress of his grievances nor his right to free speech as 
guaranteed by the Constitution confers any right, in the exer-
ances that might have obstructed our war efforts and in removing the dangers of mob 
violence (such as the Praeger case), which was apt to rise so long as the people felt 
that disloyalty was unchecked, have outweighed the evils of the law. 
The Supreme Court on review has thrown some of these cases out for lack of evi-
dence. No doubt the convictions had followed events that had inflamed the minds of the 
jury, or perhaps the charges to the jury were in too broad terms. See Emanuel Balzer 
et aL, B. 3. 
Clarence Waldron and others have had their sentences reduced by the executive (see 
trial, B. 79). Fred Krafft was pardoned by the President (case, B. 6 and 74). There 
are 150 other cases under review by the Department of Justice (see Phila. Ledger, March 
5, 1919). Fifty-one have been recommended for executive clemency, and their cases 
are now before the President (April 12, 1919). 
91 The Abby Dodge (1912), 223 U. S. 166; U. S. v. Del. & H. Co. (1,,909), 213 U. S. 
366; Harrima.n v. Interstate Com. Comm. (1908), 211 U. S. 407; Knights T. I. Co. v. 
Jarman (1902), 187 U. S. 197; James v. Bowman (1903), 190 lJ. S. 127. 
c U. S. v. Hulet M. Wells, B. 70, p. 8. See also: U. S. v. Benedict Prielh, B. 156; 
U. S. v. Olivereauz, B. 40; U. S. v. Frohwerk, B. 128; State v. Pape, 90 Conn., 98. 
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cise of these great privileges, to use them as a medium through 
which to wantonly resist or obstruct the execution of the 
laws."93 
In the second place, the law forbids one to make false statements 
that tend to injure the United States. If we deny the government 
the power of suppressing the distribution of false statements made 
with intent to destroy the morale and efficiency of the armies when 
engaged in warfare and to prevent or interfere with their lawful 
organization and recruiting, we deny it the power of self-preser-
vation.94 
But the courts also justify the action of the Government in pass-
ing the Espionage Act on the ground that greater restrictions had 
already been placed upon the press without infringing upon its rights. 
Judge Ray's argument on this point is as follows: 
"In the United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co. [220 Fed. 
458] it is held that the constitutional guarantee of the free-
dom of the press is not infringed by summary process and 
conviction for contempt for publications tending to obstruct 
the administration of justice. If this be correct,.. why may 
not Congress enact a law making it an offense to make and 
spread broadcast, when a state of war exists, pamphlets con-
taining materially false statements which are intended to 
interfere with and obstruct the lawful raising and organ-
ization of armies and military operations of the Government, 
and which pamphlets are calculated to have that effect?"95 
Looking .at the question from a different angle, Judge Hough 
argues in Friana v. U. S., that the Espionage Act does not restrict 
the freedom of speech and press at all as these are known to the 
Constitution. His language is as follows: 
"The :f.ree speech secured federally zy the First Amend-
ment means complete immunity for the publication by speech 
or print of whatever is not harmful in character when tested 
by such standards as the law affords. For these standards 
we must look to the common law rules in force when the 
Constitutional guarantees were established and in reference 
to w~ich they were adopted. 
91 U. S. v. Flo;yrJ Ramp, B. 66, p • .t (Quoted). See alse>: U. S. v. Sugarman, B. 12; 
U. S. v. Baker, 247 Fed. 124; U. S. v. O'Hare, B. 49. 
" Paraphrased from U. S. v. Clinton H. Pierce, B. 15, p. 6. See also Turner v. 
Williams, 194 U. S. 279 • 
.., U. S. v. Clinton H. Pitrce, B. r 5, p. 5. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
"By legislative action the boundaries of unpunishable 
speech have doubtless and often been enlarged, but the con-
stitutional limits remain unchanged and what the legislature 
has done it can undo. 
"Legal talk-liberty never has meant, however, the unre-
stricted right to say what one pleases at all times and under 
all circumstances."95• 
In short, freedom of speech and the press are not abridged un-
constitutionally as long as tliey are not restricted- by statute more 
severely than they were at the common law. 
Finally, the doctrine of paramount necessity was invoked by 
Judge Lewis as follows: 
''You are instructed that this guarantee cannot be suc-
cessfully invoked as a protection ~here the honor and safety 
of the nation is involved."98 
· More recently the Supreme Court itself has passed upon the 
question in the Schenk and Debs Cases. Sustaining the conviction 
of Schenk, Justice Holmes, speaking for the unanimous Bench, 
said: · 
"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendant in saying all that was said in the circular would 
have been within his constitutional rights. But the char-
acter of every act depends upon the circumstances in which 
it ~as done. The most stringent protection 9f free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting 'Fire I' in a 
theater and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man 
from an injunction against uttering words that have all the 
effect of force. The question in each case is whether the 
words were used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and. present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right 
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When· 
a nation is at war many things that might be said in time 
of peace are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utter-
ance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no 
court could regard them ·as protected by any constitutional 
right."97 . 
... U. S. v. Nearing, B. 792, p. + See a!So Cooley Principles of Constitutional Law, 
3rd ed., p. :z99 ff. 
"' iJ. S. v. Tantter, B. 56, p. 3. See also U. S. v. Capo, B. 37 (The subservicncy 
of Blackstone's definition of freedom of the press to the war powers is here laid down dis-
tinctly, p. 8). See further U. S. v. Debs, B. 155; U. S. v. Doe, B. 55. 
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v. 
CONSPIRACY. 
Complementary to Section 3 of the Espionage Act is Section 4, 
which penalizes consp.iracy to do the acts forbidden by the earlier 
section. It reads as follows: 
"If two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions 
of Sections two or three of this title, and one or more of 
such persons does any act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy, each party to the conspiracy shall be punished as 
in said sections provided in the case of the doing of the act 
the accomplishment of which is the object of the conspiracy. 
Except as a:bove provided conspiracies to commit offenses 
under this title shall be punished as provided for by Section 
37 of the Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws 
of the United States, approved March 4th, 1909."98 
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to 
do an unlawful act ;99 and when persons agree understandingly to 
accomplish an unlawful purpose there is a conspiracy though no 
word is spoken between them regarding it.100 
But in addition to the agreement there must be an overt act, 
though it is not necessary that the purpose of the conspiracy should 
have been accomplished.101 
The method of proof of a conspiracy is dealt with by Judge 
Youmans in the following passage: 
"The existence of a conspiracy may be shown either by 
direct or positive evidence, such as declarations or writings, 
or ·by circumstantial evidence showing that the parties 
charged acted in concert or in a manner or under circum-
stances warranting the inference that their acts were the 
result o~ previous understanding or agreement between 
them." 
And once a conspiracy is formed, all the conspirators are recog-
nized as principals, "although the part that some of them took 
therein is a minor or subordinate one, or is to be executed separately 
or at a distance from the other participaµts."102 
rr Schenk v. U. S., B. 194, p. 3. 
'"Stat. 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 219 (1917). 
" U. S. v. Balzer, B. 3, p. 3. See also U. S. v. Schenk, B. 43. 
100 U. S. v. Balzer, B. 3, p. 4. 
101 U. S. v. Schenk, B. 43, p. 5· 
1"' U. S. v. Balzer, B. 3, p. 5. The object of the conspiracy does not have to be 
carried out. Justice Holmes (Schenk v. U. S., B. 194), says: "If the act • • • its ten· 
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It is evident, therefore, that any agreement of persons, in fur-
therance of which there has been any overt act,~ to do any of the 
things prohibited by Section 3 of the Espionage Act, would con-
stitute a conspiracy and would ~e punishable under the law, pro-
vided the acts themselves were constitutionally prohibited; for if 
the acts themselves are constitutionally prohibited, there can be no 




If Congress had not enacted the Espionage Act or some equivalent 
measure, it is likely that the Government would have had frequent 
recourse, .in endeavoring .to repress disloyalty, to the statutes pun-
ishing treason, and that consequently the constitutional definition· of 
treason would hav~ received further elucidation from the Courts. 
This definition reads : 
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in 
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, 
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted 
of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the 
same overt act, or on confession in open court."103 
The terms here used need occupy us only briefly. Treason by 
"levying war against the United States" is treason by insurrection 
or rebellion ; hence this part of the Constitutioµal definition does not 
concern us in this place. 
The term "enemies" as used in the second clause applies, we are 
authoritatively informed, only to the citizens or subjects of a belliger-
ent power in a state of hostilities with us; while "adhering" to such 
enemies is a state of mind to be inf erred from the giving them aid 
and comfort.1°' 
dem:y, and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for 
saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime." 
10a Art. II, Sec. III, par. l. 
~°' ll. S. v. Greatlwuse, .a6 Fed. Cas. No. 15254· Giving aid and comfort is said to 
embrace "any act clearly indicating a Jack of loyalty to the Government, and which, by 
fair construction, is directly in furtherance of hostile designs." 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18372: 
An examination· of previous cases will indicate what specific actions have been held 
to constitute treason within this clause: 
(a) Trading with the enemy government, its agents or forces, whether for gain or 
for the purpose of aiding the enemy, if the natural consequence is. that the enemx Will 
receive benefit. 
(b) Communication of military intelligence. · 
(c) Joining the enemy in time of war, or offering service by letter. U. S. v. 
Greiner, Fed. Cas. No. 15262. 
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The really interesting question from the point of view of our 
present inquiry is whether utterances, spoken or written, can ever 
constitute treason. Opinion on this point was in some confusion 
before the war began and it can hardly be said to have been cleared 
up by sub5equent developments. Thus, in a charge to a jury, de-
livered in 1861, Justice Nelson of the United States Supreme Court 
said: 
"Words oral, written, or printed, however treasonable, do 
not constitute an overt act of treason within the definition of 
the crime. When spoken, written or printed in relation to an 
act or acts which, if coi:nmitted with a treasonable design, 
might constitute such overt act, they are admissible as evi~ 
dence tending to characterize it, and to show the intent with 
which the act was committed. They also furnish some evi-
dence of the act itself against the accused. This is the extent 
to whic4 such publications may be used-either in finding a 
bill of indictment or on the trial of it."105 
Five years earlier, however, Justice Curtis had held that in the 
case of treason by levying war, inciting others to rebellion was 
treasonable even though the agitator was not present in person at 
the act of war.106 
The one case which has arisen during the present war involving 
the question under discussion is that of the editors of the 
PHILADELPHIA TAGEBLATT, who were indicted for uttering publica-
tions favorable to Germany and inimical to the United States. The 
(d) Delivering up prisoners and deserters to the enemy. U. S. Y. Ilodges, 26 Fed. 
Cas. No. 15374· 
(e) Acts directed against the government or government property with the intent 
to c:ause injury thereto and in aid of the enemy. 
(f) Acts which tend and are: designed to weaken our arms. 
(g) Advising, inciting, and persuading others to give aid and comfort to the enemy. 
The outlines hen: given are taken from Charles Warren, "What is Giving Aid and 
Comfort to the Enerliy", Yale Law Journal, Jan., 1918, and L. C. Bradley, "Essay on 
Disloyalty", Princeton, 1918 (unpublished). 
1oo 5 Blatchford 549, 550. 
Senator Brandagt"e, however, in the debate on the Espionage Act, saiil: 
"H a newspaper shall publish information, when the United States is at war, which 
gives aid and comfort fo the enemy, it would be treason." C. R., 65th Cong., lst Sess., 
p. 763. 
Since the death penalty was provided by the Espionage Act for this crime we may 
say that such action is equivalent to treason in effect and in law (Title I, Sec. 2). 
Mr. Davison of New York contends that the utterance of either written or spoken 
words is as much an overt act as is any deed, and that the doing or saying or writing 
anything which tends to hearten or encourage the enemy is as much within the consti· 
tutional provision as the rendering of material physical aid to the enemy would be. 
Pamphlet on "Treason", p. 5. 
'°' l.l. S. , •• Greathouse, Fed. Cas. No. 15254. 
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articles stigmatized as treasonable were classified by the Govern• 
ment's attorney under the following captions: 
(I) Glorification of German strength and success 
( 2) Discouraging enlistments 
(3) Attacking the sll,icerity of the United States 
( 4) Obstructing our war measures 
(5) Commending German insurrections on this side 
(6) Attacking the Government 
(7) Falsifications 101 
A. demurrer to this indictment declared that the only "overt act" 
charged therein was the publication of articles indicative of dis-
loyal sentiments, wherefore, it was contended, the editors had com-
mitted no offense of a treasonable character. Judge Dickinson 
ruled, however, that the point was properly a trial question and that 
the Government should be allowed to prove that aid and comfort 
had been given to the--enemy. 
Referring to Judge Nelson's opinion, he said: 
"The opinion expressed by Judge Nelson will bear the 
construction that, although words, so long as they are words 
do not constitute an overt act of treason; yet when 'printed 
in relation to an act or acts which if committed with a trea-
sonable design.might constitute such overt act' they may be a 
part of the treasonable intent."108 
Such an act, he intimates, w.ould be the communication of intel-
ligence of value to the enemy by printing it in the paper: 
Later, too, in directing the jury to bring in a verdict of "not 
gnilty," the same judge said: 
"You might have a situation.in which it.would be appar-
ent to everyone that words of incitement, words of per-
suasion, words of appeal~ words even that would arouse bad 
emotions, which would have an effect as a train of powder 
already laid, to which the minds would be likely to act as a 
a spark, if that condition of affairs existed; then mere words 
might constitute treason. But I call your attention to the 
fact that, so far as I recall, there is no evidence in this case 
of any such condition. There is nothing in this case beyond 
the fact of publication."109 
= Bulletin 42, p. 2. 
100 U. S. v. Louis Wenner and Martin DarkOVJ, B. 42, p. + 
100 Philadelphia Record, M:irch 27, 1918, p. lO, col 2. 
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It would seem that the court implied that mere words might con-
stitute treason only if it could be clearly proved that the circum-
stances under which the words were uttered were such that treason-
able acts of violence would inevitably follow the utterance of the 
words. Such a ruling seems eminently conservative.110 
CoNsT1TuT10NAI, ~r:rs. 
The Espionage Act presents an old constitutional problem in a 
new light. Its principal results for Constitutional Law may be 
summarized thus: 
110 It may be pertinent to mention here some more drastic proposals than the Espion• 
;ige Act which failed of passage. 
The most notable of these was a bill introduced by Senator Chamberlain of Oregon, 
which ran in part as follows: 
"Be it enacted, etc. • • • that, owing to changes in the conditions of modem war• 
fare, whereby the enemy now att~pts to attack and injure the successful prosecution 
of the war by the United States by means of civilians and other agents and supporters 
behind the lines spreading false statements and propaganda, injuring and destroying the 
things and utilities prepared or adapted for the use of the land and naval forces of the 
United States, thus constituting the United States a part of the zone of operations con· 
ducted by the enemy, any person, whether a citizen or subject of the enemy country, or 
otherwise, who shall anywhere in the United States, in time of war, endanger or inter· · 
fere with the successful operation of the land or naval forces of the United States • • • 
"By printing or publishing any such printed matter, shall be deemed a spy and be 
subject to trial by a general court martial or by a military commission- of the army or by a 
court martial of the navy, and on conviction thereof such shall suffer death or such 
other punishment as said general court martial or military commission or court martial 
shall direct." · 
The constitutionality of the blll is doubtful in view of the Milligan case (4 Wall), 
in which it was held that martial law cannot exist "when the courts· are open and in the 
proper and unobstructed exercise of their function." 
The fifth Amendment, however, admits trial by other means than by jury in cases 
"arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia, V11ien in actual service in time of 
war or public danger." · 
Mr. Chamberlain attempted to extend this exception to propagandists whom he classed 
as spies. Is this extension of the term warranted? 
The 82nd Article of War makes persons found spying about certain fortified places 
subject to court martial. In the Manual for Courts llfartial, it is said that the words 
'any person' mean all' persons of whatever nationality or civil status. 
These rulings do not cover the case in question. In order to justify the classification 
of propagandists as spies, it would be necessary, probably, to show that they were in direct 
communication with the enemy. 
The bill was dropped, however, upon receipt of a letter from the President, in which 
he attacked the constitutionality and advisability of the law. 
Another bill that failed of passage provided that (1) Any organization one of whose 
Pl\rposes is to effect an industriaY, social, or economic change within the United States, 
without authority of law, by force is illegal. 
(2) Any person in war time professing to be an officer of such an orgaclzation 
shall be fined $5,000 or imprisoned. 
(3) Any o.ivner, agent, etc., of any building, who during war allows an assemblage 
of such persons therein shall be fined $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year. 
(4) Any publication advocating the principles of Sec. 1 shall be excluded from the 
mails. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
(I) The freedom of the press is not unlimited, but is limited by 
the protective·right of the community. As Chief Justice White says 
in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 247 U.S. 4I9-420: 
"The safeguarding and fructification of free and con-
stitutional institutions is the very. basis and mainstay upon 
which the freedom of the press rests, and that freedom, 
therefore, does not and cannot be held to include the right 
virtually to destroy such institutions. It suffices to say that, 
however CC?mplete is the right of the press to state public 
things and discuss them, ~hat right, as every other right en~ 
joyed in human society,· is subject to the restraints which 
separate right from wrongdoing." 
Somewhat niore specifically,. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. U. S., 
B. I94, p3, says: · 
''The question jn each case is whether the words are used 
in such Circumstances and are of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 
(2) T4e right of circulation is collateral with the right of publica-
tion. The famous dicta in the Jackson and Rapier CaseS111 must 
be so interpreted; or, if they are not, they are clearly erroneous. In 
any case, there is no right of circulation for matter whose utterance 
.1ias been penalized constitutionally by Congress.1~2 
m. E~ Parle Jackson, 96 U. S. 733 (1878). "Liberty of circulating is as essential to 
that freedom as t1berty of publishing; indeed without the circulation, the publication 
would be of little value. If, therefore, printed matter be excluded from the mails, its 
transportation in any other way cannot be forbidden by Congress." 
In re Rapier, 143 U. S. IIO (1892): "The circulation of newspapers is not prohib-
ited, but the Government declines itself to become an agent in the circulation of printed 
matter which it regards as injurious to the people." 
It may be reiterated that in Cluunpion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, the Court carefully 
avoided the question whether papers containing advertisements of lotteries could be ex· 
eluded from interstate commerce. 
=See ante, discussion of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act. 
:m "Burleson's Attitude," New York Tribune, Mar. II, 1919; Senator Chamberlain on 
"the Effect of Army Courts on Bolshevism," New York Times, Mar. II, 1919; Major 
Hume, on "Revolution," New York Evening Post, Mar. II, 1919; Att!y General Palmer's 
attitude, Evening Post, April 4, 1919. 
l;lenator New's bill embodying this sentiment would prohioit (1) The advocacy of, 
or distribution of matter tending to the "overthrow by force or violence, or by physical 
injury· to person or property, or by the general cessation of industry, of the Government 
of the United States." · 
(2) Display of the 11ag symbolizing such a purpose. 
(3) Mailing any matter urging such steps. 
(4) Importation into the United States of such mattes. 
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(3) The Censorship provision was rejected by Congress out of 
respect for the traditional opposition of press and people to any 
form of censorship. Undoubtedly, however, it was within the power 
of Congress to establish a voluntary censorship; that is, one recourse 
to which was purely optional on the part of publishers. · 
(4)· Finally, the doctrine of administrative discretion has been 
strengthened. 
' The future of the Espionage Act is doubtful. On one hand there 
is a decided demand for some such law to suppress bolshevism and 
similar movements against the Govemment.113 On the other hand 
there is an agitation for the removal of all restrictions upon speech 
and tlie press on the ground that such restrictions ai;e no longer 
necessary.1u The result remains to be seen. 
THOMAS F. C . .\RROI,I,. 
Princeton, N. J. 
(5) This section penalizes the breach of the law by a fine of $s,ooo or imprison· 
ment for five years. The bill failed of passage. 
A bill was drawn up by Major Hume, counsel for the Senate Investigating Commit· 
tee, of the same import. Sections 1·4 cover almost exactly the ground covered by the 
amended section 3, Title I of the Espionage Act. 
Section 5 repeals Section 4 of the Espionage· Act. 
Section 6 provides for the deportation of aliens violating the law. 
Section 7 repeals all Jaws in conflict with the provisions of this bill. It is said that 
Major Hume will have this bill introduced as soon as Congress assembles. 
11'In the New Yo,.k Evening Post, March II, 1919, a statement by the Civil Liber· 
tics Bureau drawa attention to the political effects of the Sedition Law of 1798, suggest• 
ing that the Espionage Act is similar to this law. It is obvious that the circumstances of 
the two cases arc not parallel 
In the Evening Post, Mar. II, 1919, a statement of the Civil Liberties Bureau 
charges that the Government is holding men convicted under the Espionage Act as politi• 
cal prisoners. 
The Nation leads other periodicals in a publicity campaign for the repeal of the 
Espionage Act. These papers put the responsibility for the act entirely on the Demo-
cratic party and warn the Democrats that the effect is likely to be politically di~rous. 
But neither party can be given full credit for the passage of the act. The Republicans 
have the advantage in case the measure should be made a political issue only in the fact 
that they were oppose,d to conferring power on the Postmaster General. 
